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Article
Insuring Against Guns?
GEORGE A. MOCSARY

This Article examines whether mandating liability insurance for
firearm owners would meet its avowed goals of efficiently
compensating shooting victims and deterring unlawful and
accidental shootings without creating a net social loss by chilling
socially beneficial gun use. In the process, the Article also examines
whether nonmandatory liability insurance may enable socially
desirable, but potentially risky, firearm-related activities.
The analysis indicates that a compulsory firearm-liability
insurance regime is unlikely to attain its goals, and may in fact
exacerbate the problems it seeks to solve by incentivizing firearm
owners to take less care with their weapons. It also shows that it is
markedly unlikely that such a mandate would achieve a significant
level of compliance. Optional forms of firearm-liability insurance
can, however, enable socially desirable activities by those who
would otherwise be unable to bear the risks inherent in those
activities.
One of the best ways to incentivize an activity is to compensate it
or to remove its financial consequences. Well-meaning legislators,
regulators, and industry members would therefore best serve their
constituencies by encouraging optional insurance that covers
liability risks arising from socially useful activities, rather than
pushing for unhelpful mandates that may aggravate the firearm
violence that they seek to remedy.
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Insuring Against Guns?
GEORGE A. MOCSARY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to some appalling shootings that recently captured the
nation’s attention,1 legislators, economists, and journalists have called for
the enactment of laws making firearm-liability insurance a prerequisite to
purchasing or owning a weapon.2 A number of such laws have been
proposed, but to date none have been enacted.3
Proponents of compulsory liability insurance for gun owners hope that
insurance would provide a source of monetary compensation for shooting
victims and their families, while serving as a source of private regulation
that would determine who may have a firearm, create incentives for
insurers to require firearm owners to take care that their weapons are not
involved in gun crime, and place the costs created by guns onto their
owners.4 Although preventing and covering the costs of gun accidents is a
*

Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law. Fordham University School of
Law, J.D., summa cum laude, 2009; University of Rochester Simon School of Business, M.B.A., 1997.
I would like to thank Tom Baker, James Berles, Lisa Bernstein, andré douglas pond cummings,
Victoria C. Duke, Judith K. Fitzgerald, David Karpis, Peter Kochenburger, Nicholas J. Johnson, James
T. Lindgren, Irina Manta, Charles E. MacLean, Nancy C. Marcus, Michael P. O’Shea, Phebe E.
Poydras, Steven Richardson, William Schroeder, Peter Siegelman, and the members of the University
of Chicago Law School’s Legal Scholarship Workshop for their valuable insights and feedback. I am
grateful to Breanne E. Sergent for her excellent research and editing, and to Michael Morthland, Shane
Swords, and Chad Vincente for their research.
1
E.g., Aurora, Colorado Shooting News, ABCNEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/topics/news/auroracolorado-shooting.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2014); Complete Coverage on Sandy Hook School
Shootings, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/us/connecticut-school-shooting/ (last visited Apr.
12, 2014).
2
See, e.g., Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Buying a Gun? States Consider Insurance
Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2013, at A1 (describing legislative proposals); Caitlin Kenney,
Should Gun Owners Have to Buy Liability Insurance?, NPR (Jan. 31, 2013,
5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2013/01/31/170700177/should-gun-owners-have-to-buyliability-insurance (interviewing economists); John Wasik, Newtown’s New Reality:
Using Liability Insurance to Reduce Gun Deaths, FORBES (Dec. 17, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2012/12/17/newtowns-new-reality-using-liability-insurance-toreduce-gun-deaths/ (discussing the journalist’s viewpoint).
3
See infra Part II.B.
4
See, e.g., Cooper & Walsh, supra note 2; Elizabeth Bunn, U.S. Insurers Resist Push to Make
Gun Owners Get Coverage, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0219/u-s-insurers-resist-push-to-make-gun-owners-get-coverage.html; Tom Harvey, The Case for
Compulsory Gun Insurance, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tomharvey/the-case-for-compulsory-g_b_4029894.html; Kenney, supra note 2.
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consideration, advocates of firearm-liability insurance are primarily
motivated by a desire to prevent criminal shootings and compensate guncrime victims.5 Proponents generally suggest that the goal of a mandatory
firearm-liability system would not be gun control, but rather a reliance on
private market mechanisms to both screen potential gun owners and cause
them to bear the costs of their ownership.6
Opponents, including insurers, have argued that, instead of achieving
its stated goals, compulsory insurance would likely compensate only a few
shooting victims, would not impact gun possession by those who misuse
firearms, would create incentives for gun owners to be less careful with
their weapons, and would be problematic to implement.7 Some also raise
concerns that forcing firearm owners to insure themselves and their
weapons may suffer from constitutional infirmities.8
Both the hopes of proponents and the concerns of opponents deserve
attention. This Article uses economic analysis, evidence from other
attempts at firearm regulation, and other legal tools to directly examine the
question at the heart of the debate over mandated firearm-liability
insurance: whether and how effectively insurance can curb and compensate
for criminal gun violence.9 Much of the discussion also applies to
5

See, e.g., Ameya Pawar, Op-Ed., Insure Guns to Ensure We Save Lives, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 26,
2013, at C21; Harvey, supra note 4; H.L. Pohlman, Op-Ed., Requiring Gun Insurance Will Increase
Safety, HARTFORD COURANT (Feb. 1, 2013), http://articles.courant.com/2013-02-01/news/hc-oppohlman-insurance-to-curb-gun-violence-0103-20130201_1_gun-owners-gun-violence-rapid-fireweapons.
This Article considers suicides, which comprise the majority of shooting deaths, see infra note
143, to be distinct from other intentional shootings and accidental shootings. Suicides are unlikely to
be covered by liability insurances policies save in very rare circumstances. See Peter Kochenburger,
Liability Insurance and Gun Violence, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1265, 1274–75 (2014); infra notes 219, 222,
285. But see infra text accompanying notes 79–80, 155–156 (describing Oregon’s proposed statute that
would require coverage of suicides).
6
See, e.g., Pohlman, supra note 5; Wasik, supra note 2.
7
See Am. Ass’n of Ins. Servs., Missing the Target: Gun Insurance Proposals Overlook Important
Realities of the Risks, VIEWPOINT MAG., Winter 2013, at 3, 6; Bunn, supra note 4; Thomas Harman,
Insurers Skeptical of State Moves Toward Mandatory Liability Insurance for Gun Owners, ADVISEN
FPN (Jan. 29, 2013), http://fpn.advisen.com/articles/article192441274-1504094012.html; James
Taranto, Insurance as Punishment, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB
10001424127887323452204578290151788526728.
8
See generally Stephen G. Gilles & Nelson Lund, Mandatory Liability Insurance for Firearm
Owners: Design Choices and Second Amendment Limits, 14 ENGAGE 18 (2013) (predicting
constitutional pitfalls for gun liability insurance mandates, and recommending potential solutions).
9
Scholars have looked at the intersection of firearm injury and insurance from other angles. See,
e.g., Tom Baker & Thomas O. Farrish, Liability Insurance & the Regulation of Firearms, in SUING THE
GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 292, 299–305
(Timothy D. Layton ed., 2005) (focusing on existing residential insurance products for individuals and
on product-liability and business-related liabilities for businesses); Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff,
Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV.
1412, 1431–33 (2013) (focusing on gun liability insurance as a form of regulation). See generally
Gilles & Lund, supra note 8 (focusing on constitutional implications).
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accidental firearm injuries. The Article concludes that, although insurance
may have some positive effects along a few limited dimensions and is
likely to enable some risky but otherwise socially beneficial activities, on
the whole it should not be expected to either curb gun violence or
compensate its victims. Indeed, a mandatory insurance system is likely to
make matters worse in several respects, potentially exacerbating the
problems that it seeks to alleviate.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in five parts. Part II sets forth
the relevant statutory and insurance background, including existing federal
statutes limiting shooting liability, the compulsory-insurance bills proposed
thus far, and existing insurance products for firearm owners. Part III
discusses the role of liability insurance as a private regulator, including
some likely problems with relying on liability insurance to combat gun
violence. Part IV discusses the ways in which insurance can serve as an
enabler of desirable activities, including beneficial firearm use. Part V
examines how the presence of mandatory insurance is likely to impact the
behavior of insured gun owners. Part VI challenges the premise that a gunowner-liability-insurance mandate could be implemented with a degree of
compliance that would justify deeming it successful.
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL AND INSURANCE ENVIRONMENTS
This Part begins by describing two federal statutes that limit firearmrelated tort liability: the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act and
the Child Safety Lock Act. It then discusses the various federal and state
legislative proposals that would have required would-be firearm owners to
carry liability insurance when they purchase or possess firearms. The Part
concludes by surveying the available insurance products specifically
intended for firearm owners.
A. Existing Statutes
This Section discusses the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms
Act.10 The enacted law consists of two main components, typically
referred to as the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act
(“PLCAA”)11 and the Child Safety Lock Act (“CSLA”).12 Each Act’s
relevant provisions are discussed below.

10

Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005).
Pub. L. No. 109-92, §§ 1–4, 119 Stat. 2095, 2095–99 (2005) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7901–03 (2012)).
12
Pub. L. No. 109-92, § 5, 119 Stat. 2095, 2099–101 (2005) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 922 (2012)).
11
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1. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act
The PLCAA bans, with some minor exceptions, civil lawsuits in both
federal and state court against manufacturers and sellers of properly
functioning firearms.13 The Act provides exceptions for suits alleging
negligent entrustment, negligence per se, and harm from situations arising
from the violation of a state or federal statute that “expressly” or “clearly
can be said to” regulate the sale or marketing of firearms.14 The PLCAA
states that its purposes are to, among other things, “preserve a citizen’s
access to a supply of firearms and ammunition for all lawful purposes,
including hunting, self-defense, collecting, and competitive or recreational
shooting. . . . [and] [t]o guarantee a citizen’s rights, privileges, and
immunities, as applied to the States, under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.”15
The Act thus immunizes manufacturers and sellers from practically all
tort liability resulting from the criminal or accidental misuse of a firearm
by purchasers and third parties, as long as the firearm was properly
functioning and sold in compliance with all laws.16 Because liability
cannot attach in these situations, insurance is inappropriate because the
would-be insured has no insurable interest, the loss of which would result
in financial harm, to protect with insurance.17
2. Child Safety Lock Act
The CSLA requires pistols transferred to consumers by licensed
13
15 U.S.C. §§ 7902–03. Suits pending at the time of the Act’s passage were made subject to
dismissal. Id. § 7902(b); see NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON ET AL., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND
AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS AND POLICY 520 (2012). Product-liability lawsuits are not barred.
15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iv)–(v).
14
15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)–(B); see City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384,
398–404 (2d Cir. 2008).
15
15 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(2)–(3). Other purposes were to prevent lawsuits from creating
“unreasonable burdens on interstate and foreign commerce” and to protect the First Amendment rights
of firearm manufacturers and sellers. Id. § 7901(b)(4)–(5).
16
See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1135–37 (9th Cir. 2009). A thorough search yielded
fewer than a dozen cases decided on the basis of the negligent entrustment or negligence per se
exceptions, and most of those were dismissals. The full results of the search are on file with the author.
17
This Article assumes that the PLCAA will continue to remain in effect and that a mandatoryinsurance system would not be construed to require coverage for claims not supported by insurable
interests, whether or not the relevant statute or regulation excluded such coverage from its
requirements. Although the statutes proposed so far do not carve out these exceptions, insurers could
price them at zero. Nonetheless, there would be some administrative costs to insurers providing this
coverage and handling losing claims based thereon.
In the liability-insurance context, an insured has an insurable interest if it is possible for an event
to happen that can create liability under the insurance. ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R.
RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 44[c] (5th ed. 2012). Though the typical policies
behind requiring an insurable interest of preventing gambling and preventing the insured from
destroying the object of the insurance do not apply with strength in the liability context, an insurable
interest is nonetheless required for a liability policy to be valid. Id. §§ 40, 44[c].
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firearm dealers, manufacturers, and importers to be accompanied by a
“secure gun storage or safety device.”18 A secure gun storage or safety
device can either be a gun safe or similarly lockable storage unit, or a
device that attaches to the pistol.19
Relevant to the question of when gun owner liability insurance may be
appropriate to protect an insurable interest, the Act immunizes the lawful
owner of a handgun from most types of civil-damages lawsuits resulting
from the criminal or other misuse of the weapon by an unauthorized third
party.20 The immunity applies as long as the handgun “had been made
inoperable by use of a secure gun storage or safety device” when
accessed.21 Like the PLCAA, the CSLA does not provide protection from
suits for negligent entrustment or negligence per se.22 Unlike its
companion statute, it protects both business and consumer firearm
owners.23
The CSLA thus creates a second category where, in the absence of
preemptive federal legislation explicitly making its provisions inapplicable,
compulsory liability insurance for firearm owners is inappropriate.
Finally, and similarly to the PLCAA, one purpose of the CSLA is “to avoid
hindering industry from supplying firearms to law abiding citizens for all
lawful purposes, including hunting, self-defense, collecting, and
competitive or recreational shooting.”24
With the PLCAA and CSLA setting the boundaries within which a
firearm-liability-insurance statute may operate, the next Section looks at
the insurance requirements that legislatures have hitherto proposed.
B. Proposed Federal and State Legislation
This Section describes the federal and state mandatory firearmliability-insurance proposals made to date. In the process, it begins to
highlight some of the nuances of the potential post-enactment systems that
each proposal implies. None of the proposals described below have
become law.
1. Federal Firearms Risk Protection Act
The Firearms Risk Protection Act of 2013 would have required firearm
18

18 U.S.C. § 922(z)(1) (2012).
Id. § 921(a)(34).
20
Id. § 922(z)(3).
21
Id. § 922(z)(3)(C)(i)(I).
22
Id. § 922(z)(3)(C)(ii).
23
Id. § 921(a)(1). With the possible exception of intentional shootings (and even there if
vicarious-liability doctrines apply), there is little or no distinction to be made between business and
individual firearm owners vis-à-vis firearm-liability insurance. As such, this Article treats them alike
unless it states otherwise.
24
Pub. L. No. 109-92, § 5(b)(3), 119 Stat. 2095, 2099 (2005).
19
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owners to be covered by a liability insurance policy if they bought or came
to “own[]” a firearm that had been purchased after the Act’s effective
date.25 It also would have required firearm sellers to verify that would-be
purchasers are covered by insurance.26 Governments and their agencies
would have been exempt from the requirement.27 The required insurance
would have had to cover “the purchaser specifically for losses resulting
from use of the firearm while it is owned by the purchaser” and must have
had to be issued by an insurer licensed in the purchaser’s state.28 The
proposal was thus unclear as to whether the required insurance would have
covered intentional shootings, including malicious criminal shootings, by
the owner or third parties. The penalty for noncompliance would have
been a fine of up to $10,000.29
The bill’s sponsor presented it to the House of Representatives “as a
market-based solution to holding gun owners liable for the weapons they
own,” while stating, in accord with the proposal’s text, that it “pose[d] no
specific requirements on insurance companies themselves.”30 It would
have applied to purchases 180 days after its enactment.31 The Act would
thus have required new would-be owners to carry insurance, but would not
have required either insurers or states to provide the coverage.
2. California
Two California Assemblymen proposed a bill requiring firearm-owner
liability insurance,32 but the proposed text of the bill has not been made
public and the insurance provision was not in the version voted on by the
legislature.33 They equated a liability requirement for gun owners to
mandated automobile insurance for drivers.34 One of the bill’s sponsors
stated that the insurance “would encourage gun owners to take firearms
safety classes and keep their guns locked up to get lower insurance rates.”35
The other said that his proposal would have required all gun owners to
25

Firearm Risk Protection Act of 2013, H.R. 1369, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2013).
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. § 2(b).
30
159 CONG. REC. E370 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2013) (statement of Rep. Maloney).
31
H.R. 1369, 113th Cong. § 2(c).
32
Don Thompson, California Bill Would Force Gun Owners to Buy Insurance, INS. J. (Feb. 7,
2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2013/02/07/280464.htm.
33
Robert Farago, California Mandatory Gun Insurance Bill AB-231 Revealed. Ish.,
THETRUTHABOUTGUNS.COM (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.thetruthaboutguns.com/2013/02/robertfarago/california-mandatory-gun-insurance-bill-revealed-or-not/; see Assemb. B. No. 231, 2013 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (enacted).
34
Thompson, supra note 32.
35
See id. (referencing Assemblyman Jimmy Gomez’s comments). The truth of the assumption
that mandatory automobile liability insurance has improved driving habits or road safety is
questionable. See infra Part V.A.
26
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36

carry the insurance, but that the bill would have neither forced insurers to
cover illegal or intentional acts nor required insurance companies to offer
the insurance.37 His intent was to manage gun violence and to cause gun
owners, rather than taxpayers, to bear the costs of firearm accidents.38
3. Connecticut’s Three Proposals
Connecticut legislators have proposed three bills relating to
compulsory liability insurance for gun owners. House Bill 5268 contained
a dual mandate to “require firearm owners to maintain liability insurance”
and to establish a fifty percent tax on ammunition not sold and consumed
at a shooting range.39 The bill provided no other detail on the insurance or
tax requirement. Most notably, it did not require insurers operating in the
state to offer the mandated insurance. The bill’s sponsor acknowledged
that such insurance was a new concept that he had not discussed with
insurers.40 Like one of the California bill’s sponsors, he hoped that
mandatory insurance would “lead[] to improvement in gun safety in much
the same manner driving habits improved following the introduction of
mandatory automobile insurance.”41
His website stated that the
ammunition tax intended to “limit[] access in Connecticut to . . .
ammunition.”42
House Bill 5452 was somewhat more detailed than its predecessor. It
would have required firearm purchasers to present proof of liability
insurance to dealers and current firearm owners to obtain liability
insurance “for such firearm[s].”43 Like its predecessor, the bill did not
require Connecticut insurers to offer the coverage that it would have
mandated, nor did it state a minimum insurance requirement. The bill’s
text seemed to call for separate coverage for each firearm, excluding
blanket coverage for all of an insured’s firearms.44
House Bill 6656 proposed that both owners and those who possess
firearms (except on a temporary basis at a gun club) must have in place
“personal liability insurance that provides coverage for bodily injury or
36

See Thompson, supra note 32 (referencing Assemblyman Philip Ting’s comments).
Bunn, supra note 4.
38
Id.
39
H.B. 5268, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2013).
40
Harman, supra note 7.
41
Id.
42
Rep. Godfrey to Introduce Package of Firearms, Ammunition Laws, CONN. HOUSE
DEMOCRATS (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.housedems.ct.gov/godfrey/2012/pr110_2012-12-20.html.
The website also stated that the ammunition tax was part of a package of gun-control proposals
intended to make it more difficult to obtain firearms and ammunition, and to require the registration of
“all firearms.” Id.
43
H.B. 5452, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2013).
44
See id. (referring to insurance coverage for “such firearm” rather than the gun owner’s
collection as a whole (emphasis added)).
37
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property damage caused by the use of a firearm” and “self defense
insurance that provides coverage for civil and criminal defense costs and
provides for reimbursement of criminal defense costs if such person uses a
firearm in self defense.”45 Violators of the insurance requirements would
have been guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.46 Unlike its two predecessors,
House Bill 6656 would have required the Connecticut Insurance
Commissioner to adopt regulations to implement the insurance
requirements, including minimum coverage amounts and permissible
exclusions.47
4. District of Columbia
The District of Columbia’s Firearm Insurance Amendment Act of 2013
would have required D.C.’s firearm owners, except for peace officers, to
maintain $250,000 of liability insurance to “specifically cover any
damages resulting from negligent acts, or willful acts that are not
undertaken in self-defense, involving the use of the insured firearm while it
is owned by the policy holder.”48 Like Connecticut’s House Bill 5452, text
suggests that the Act would have required individual coverage for each
firearm owned.49 The Act would have imposed a rebuttable presumption
that a person is the owner of a lost or stolen firearm until the loss or theft is
reported to the police.50 The penalty for not maintaining the insurance
would have been revocation of firearm-ownership privileges,51 which in
turn would have entailed a criminal penalty if possession was maintained.52
Like the proposals discussed so far, D.C.’s would not have required
insurers to offer the coverage that it mandated. The proposal would have
required firearm owners to obtain the mandated insurance within thirty
days of the Act’s passage.53
5. Illinois’s Two Proposals
Illinois’s first proposal, Amendment 20 to House Bill 1155, would
have amended its criminal code to require holders of handgun carry
licenses to maintain $1,000,000 of liability insurance to cover “negligent or
willful acts involving the use of the firearm while it is owned by that
45

H.B. 6656, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2013).
Id.
47
Id.
48
B. 20-0170, 2013 Council, Reg. Sess. (D.C. 2013). Interestingly, and unlike Connecticut’s
House Bill 6656, the D.C. proposal seems intentionally to have excluded a requirement to obtain selfdefense coverage.
49
See id. (referring to coverage for “the insured firearm” (emphasis added)).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
See D.C. CODE § 22-4503 (LexisNexis 2013) (providing criminal penalties for the unlawful
possession of a firearm).
53
B. 20-0170.
46
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person.” Like Connecticut’s House Bill 5452 and D.C.’s Act, amended
House Bill 1155 would seemingly have required individual coverage for
each firearm owned.55
Like D.C.’s proposal, Illinois’s created a
presumption that one was the owner of a lost or stolen firearm until the loss
or theft was reported to the police.56 The penalty for not maintaining the
insurance would have been revocation of the owner’s Firearm Owner’s
Identification Card, which is required by state law to carry or own a
firearm.57 Interestingly, the proposal would have required the State Police,
rather than the Illinois Department of Insurance, to adopt the rules needed
to implement the mandate.58 The amendment would not have required
insurers operating in Illinois to provide the coverage that it mandated.59
The amended bill’s sponsor stated that a policy under House Bill 1155 for
carry-license holders would cost between $500 and $2,000—although he
did not specify, presumably he envisioned this to be a yearly cost.60
The state’s second proposal, House Bill 2589, was nearly identical to
its first, with the relevant exceptions that it would have: (1) applied to all
firearm owners rather than only to holders of handgun carry licenses;
(2) not required the State Police to adopt rules in relation to the statute (it
did not discuss any further rulemaking); and (3) been “[e]ffective
immediately” upon passage.61
6. Maryland
Maryland’s Senate Bill 577 would have required anyone who
possesses a firearm to have $250,000 of liability coverage for “accidental
injuries caused by the firearm.”62 This language, like that of the other state
proposals, is unclear as to whether it requires firearm-specific, or only
owner-specific, coverage. The bill would have apparently applied to any
temporary possession by third parties that was authorized by the owner,
because it would have provided that “[a] person may not sell, rent, or
54

H.B. 1155 amend. 20, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013).
See id. (referring to “the firearm” (emphasis added)).
56
Id.
57
Id. This provision, specifically targeting handgun carry licensees, was presumably passed in
response to Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012), which declared Illinois’s concealed
carry ban unconstitutional and required the state to adopt concealed-carry legislation. See Illinois
Lawmakers Reject Firearm Liability Insurance Bill, INS. J. (Mar. 21, 2013),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/midwest/2013/03/21/285431.htm.
58
H.B. 1155 amend. 20.
59
Id.
60
Illinois Lawmakers Reject Firearm Liability Insurance Bill, supra note 57 (referencing State
Representative Kenneth Dunkin’s remarks). At these rates, the yearly cost is very likely to be higher
than the cost of the carried firearm. Dunkin also did not say whether he envisioned the cost to be per
license holder, irrespective of how many weapons he or she owned, or to somehow incorporate the
number of weapons owned. Id.
61
H.B. 2589, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013).
62
S.B. 577, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013).
55
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transfer a firearm” to anyone without the prescribed coverage. The fine
for a violation of the requirement would have been up to $1,000,64 and
existing firearm owners would have been given three months beyond the
statute’s effective date to come into compliance.65 It would not have
required Maryland insurers to provide the coverage in question.66
7. Massachusetts
Massachusetts’s House Bill 3253 would have provided that anyone
who “possess [sic], carries, or owns a firearm,” other than on a temporary
basis at a licensed gun club, either maintain liability insurance or post a
bond.67 The proposal did not provide any further detail, but would have
required the Massachusetts Commissioner of Insurance to promulgate
regulations that included minimum policy limits.68 The penalty for
noncompliance would have been a fine of $500 to $5,000 and/or up to one
year’s imprisonment.69
The sponsor “said his bill might result in insurers pricing gun liability
insurance according to risk, including factors such as how many guns are
owned in the home, how those weapons are stored, and whether they are
kept in a locked area.”70 Like the sponsor of Connecticut’s House Bill
5268, the Massachusetts bill’s sponsor envisioned the insurance mandate
improving firearm safety much as he believed that compulsory automobile
insurance had improved car safety.71
8. New York
New York’s Assembly Bill 3908A would have required firearm
owners to maintain $250,000 of liability coverage to cover damages
resulting from “negligent acts involving the use of such firearm while it is
owned by such person.”72 Like other proposals, this language might have
intended to require that each firearm, rather than each owner, be separately
insured.73 Like the D.C. and Illinois proposals, one would have been
presumed to own a lost or stolen firearm until the status of the firearm was
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Id.
Id. It is unclear whether the fine would have been a criminal or civil one.
65
Id. The bill was proposed on February 1, 2013. Id.
66
Id.
67
H.B. 3253, 188th Gen. Court., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Harman, supra note 7.
71
See id.
72
Assemb. B. 3908A, 2013–2014 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013). The original version of the
bill would have required $1,000,000 of coverage. Assemb. B. 3908, 2013–2014 Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2013).
73
See Assemb. B. 3908A (referring to “such firearm” (emphasis added)).
64
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74

reported to the police. Like D.C.’s proposal, it exempted peace officers
from its requirements.75 The proposal would have gone into effect ninety
days after its passage, and compliance by firearm owners would have been
required thirty days after that.76 Failure to maintain insurance would have
resulted in an inability to possess firearms.77 Like Connecticut’s House
Bill 6656 and Massachusetts’s House Bill 3253, the New York bill would
have directed the state’s Insurance Department to promulgate the rules
needed for its implementation.78
9. Oregon
Oregon’s Senate Bill 758 is the most detailed of the proposals for
compulsory firearm-liability insurance made to date. It would have
required anyone who owns a firearm to maintain a minimum $250,000 of
coverage for “accidental, negligent or intentional act[s].”79 Under the bill,
an insured would have been strictly liable up to the coverage limits for
injuries caused by covered firearms, and an insurer’s liability for injury and
damages under the policy would have been absolute.80 The bill would
have permitted policies in which the insurer was able to subrogate against
its insured for claims paid.81
The bill explicitly would have required coverage on a per-firearm basis
and would have required transferors to verify that transferees were
insured.82 In addition, it would have required that owners who transfer a
firearm inform the State Police of each transfer, and that insurers notify
both the State Police and the Department of Consumer and Business
Services (the state’s insurance regulator) ten days before they cancel an
insured’s policy because of nonpayment.83 The bill would have deemed a
firearm’s owner to be a person who held title or a similar traditional
ownership interest in the weapon or who “possesse[d] the firearm without
the express permission of [one with a traditional ownership interest].”84
74

Id.
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. While New York State requires registration of handguns, it does not require registration of
long guns. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2) (McKinney 2013). It is thus unclear whether noncompliance
in the latter case, coupled with possession, would be punishable criminally, civilly, or at all.
78
Assemb. B. 3908A.
79
S.B. 758, 77th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013). The coverage would have had to include
the insured’s family members who reside in the insured’s household. Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. Subrogation would have been available for claims based on intentional, negligent, or
accidental harms, as opposed to merely intentional harms as might be expected. See Baker & Farrish,
supra note 9, at 313 (noting the intentional harm exclusion commonly found in insurance policies).
82
S.B. 758.
83
Id.
84
Id.
75
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One with a traditional ownership interest would have been deemed the
owner either until one year after he or she reported the firearm lost or
stolen, or until another person insured the firearm.85 The bill would have
mandated a $10,000 civil fine for each firearm that was not insured as
required by the statute.86 The bill would have exempted the service
weapons of peace officers and members of the military.87 Its firearmowner-facing provisions would have gone into effect on January 1, 2014,
with firearm owners having to comply within one year of that date.88 It
also would have granted the State Police and the Department of Consumer
and Business Services immediate rulemaking authority upon passage.89
10. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania’s House Bill 521 would have required applicants for and
holders of concealed carry licenses to maintain $1,000,000 of liability
coverage for injury and property damage resulting from “negligent or
willful acts involving the use of an insured firearm.”90 The bill would have
explicitly exempted unlawful acts from coverage,91 implying that coverage
for colorable self-defense shootings would have been required, but it
would have banned coverage for malicious shootings (at least those
committed by the firearm’s owner92).
As with other proposals, the bill’s language could have been
interpreted to require per-firearm, rather than per-owner, coverage.93 The
noncompliance penalty would have included loss of the ability to carry a
concealed firearm, along with additional fines and misdemeanor charges
depending on the number of times the statute was violated.94 The proposed
act would have become effective sixty days after its passage.95 It would
not have required insurers writing in Pennsylvania to offer the coverage.96
85

Id.
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. The bill was introduced on February 26, 2013. 2013 Session: Senate Bill 758,
OREGONLIVE.COM, http://gov.oregonlive.com/bill/2013/SB758/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
89
S.B. 758.
90
H.B. 521, 197th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013).
91
Id.
92
See infra text accompanying notes 97–98, 122, 151, 215 and accompanying text (discussing
coverage for negligence leading to an intentional shooting as distinguished from criminal shootings).
93
See H.B. 521 (referring to an “insurance identification certificate” that would have had to have
been carried “with the insured firearm” (emphasis added)).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
A spokesperson for the Pennsylvania Insurance Department noted that “mandating any
coverage does not automatically create an appetite for insurers to provide that coverage.” Young Ha &
Don Jergler, Gun Liability Insurance Measures Facing Uphill Battle In State
Legislatures, INS. J. (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2013/04/12/2879
75.htm (internal quotation marks omitted).
86
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C. Existing Insurance Products for Firearm Owners
Much of the liability faced by gun owners is already insurable under
available insurance products. Standard homeowners’ and renters’ policies
typically cover negligence involving firearms, including negligence that
leads to an intentional shooting (e.g., negligent entrustment or negligent
storage).97 Nevertheless, the language of intentional- and illegal-acts
exclusions can disqualify some negligence claims against co-insureds and
negligence claims involving criminal or allegedly criminal activity.98
Similarly, some policies cover self-defense shootings while others exclude
them.99 Umbrella policies can provide further protection once the limits of
a homeowner’s or renter’s policy have been reached.100
The following Table shows some existing insurance and insurance-like
products specifically designed for firearm owners. Generally speaking,
these products offer benefits to their purchasers who face liability or other
expenses from the use of a lawfully possessed weapon.

97
See Hearing on B. 20-170, The Firearm Insurance Amendment Act of 2013 Before the Comm.
on Business, Consumer, and Regulatory Affairs, 2013 Council 3 (D.C. 2013) (testimony of Chester A.
McPherson, Deputy Comm’r of the Department of Insurance, Securities, and Banking) [hereinafter
Hearing on B. 20-170]; Baker & Farrish, supra note 9, at 299; Cooper & Walsh, supra note 2; Judy
Selby & Zachary Rosenberg, What to Know About Gun Owner Liability Insurance, BAKERHOSTETLER
(Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.bakerlaw.com/articles/law360-selby-and-rosenberg-outline-gun-controlliability-insurance-options-3-27-2013.
98
Kochenburger, supra note 5, Part II.C.1; see also Cooper & Walsh, supra note 2 (discussing
how different jurisdictions treat claims when criminal activity is involved); Selby & Rosenberg, supra
note 97 (discussing how the language of a policy impacts how it is applied when criminal or alleged
activity is involved).
99
Kochenburger, supra note 5, Part II.C.2.
100
CHRISTOPHER J. MONGE, THE GUN OWNER’S GUIDE TO INSURANCE FOR CONCEALED CARRY
AND SELF DEFENSE 42–43 (2013).
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TABLE 1
Program

Coverage by Potential
Liability Type
Criminal

CCW
Safe101

Civil

Pays all legal defense attorneys’ fees
on member’s behalf.
Individual
Family (two members)

Patriot
Legal
Protection
Plan/
CHLPP102

101

Yearly
Cost

$99
$150

Pays all legal defense attorneys’ fees
on member’s behalf.
Individual
Family (two members)
Family (three members)

$129103
$229104
$329105

Comments

• Applies only to colorable
self-defense situations.
• Must use one of the
provider’s attorneys.
• Member is entitled to
payment of criminal defense
costs even if he or she is
found liable.
• Member must have a valid
concealed-carry permit.
• Also explicitly covers
administrative proceedings.
• Not classified as insurance,
but as a “Legal Services
Contract.”
• Applies only to colorable
self-defense situations.
• Must use one of the
provider’s attorneys.
• Member is entitled to
payment of criminal defense
costs even if he or she is
found liable.
• Applies to pistols only; does
not cover long gun use.
• Excludes discovery, court
fees, expert fees, and similar
expenses.
• Excludes appeals.
• Not classified as insurance,
but as a “Legal Services
Agreement.”

CCW SAFE, http://ccwsafe.com/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
Sign-Up, PATRIOT LEGAL PROTECTION, https://patriotlegalprotection.com/sign-up/ (last visited
Apr. 15, 2014); Telephone Interview with Christopher J. Monge, Insurance Agent and Author of The
Gun Owner’s Guide to Insurance for Concealed Carry and Self Defense (Oct. 11, 2013); Telephone
Interview with Sales Representative at Patriot Legal Protection (Oct. 11, 2013).
103
The cost is $149 per year if the member does not hold a concealed-carry permit. Sign-Up,
supra note 102.
104
The cost is $259 per year if one of the members does not hold a concealed-carry permit. Id.
105
The cost is $369 per year if one of the members does not hold a concealed-carry permit. Id.
102
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Coverage by Potential
Liability Type
Criminal

SelfDefense
SHIELD106

Reimburses legal
defense fees
on member’s
behalf up to
coverage limit:

$50,000
$75,000
$100,000

Civil

Yearly
Cost

Pays legal fees
and civil
judgments
on member’s
behalf up to
coverage
limit:
$75,000
$150,000
$500,000

$127
$197
$297

plus attorneyretainer coverage
of:
$5,000;
$7,500;
or $10,000,
respectively

Lockton
Personal
Firearms
Liability
Insurance107

None.

Pays legal fees
and civil
judgments
up to
coverage limit:
$100,000
$250,000
$500,000
$1,000,000

$47
$67
$100
$200
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Comments

• Applies only to colorable
self-defense situations.
• Violation of concealed-carry
laws do not bar coverage (if
gun ownership is otherwise
lawful).
• Criminal defense
reimbursement only available
in the event of acquittal or
dismissal; attorney-retainer
coverage always available.
• Civil defense costs apply
against coverage limits.
• Coverage for member’s
family in the home.
• Insurance-backed member
benefit; member is a
beneficiary of a master
policy held by the U.S.
Concealed Carry Association
or the Home Defense
Association of America.
• Related benefits include:
bail-bond funding ($2,500;
$5,000; or $10,000), and
compensation for days spent
in court ($250, $350, or $500
per day).
• Applies only to hunting,
trapping, and target-shooting
situations.
• Civil defense costs do not
apply against coverage
limits.

106
USCCA
MEMBER
BOOKLET
16–26
(2013),
available
at
https://www.usconcealedcarry.com/pdf/USCCA-Memberkit-Booklet-2013_6-6-13_WebVersion.pdf;
Membership, U.S. CONCEALED CARRY ASS’N, https://www.usconcealedcarry.com/membership/
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014); Self-Defense Shield, U.S. CONCEALED CARRY ASS’N,
https://www.usconcealedcarry.com/shield/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
107
LOCKTON AFFINITY, LLC, LOCKTON PERSONAL FIREARMS LIABILITY WITH OPTIONAL SELFDEFENSE INSURANCE APPLICATION (2013), available at http://www.locktonrisk.com/nrains/forms/Pers
onal%20Firearms%20Liability%20w%20opt%20SD%20App%208-13.pdf; LOCKTON AFFINITY, LLC,
PERSONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY FORM (2013), available at http://www.locktonrisk.com/nrai
ns/forms/Excess_Personal_Liability_Certificate_of_Insurance.pdf [hereinafter LOCKTON LIABLITY
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Coverage by Potential
Liability Type
Criminal

Lockton
Risk SelfDefense
Insurance108

Second
Defense
Alliance109

Civil

Reimburses
legal defense
fees up to
coverage
limit:

Pays legal
fees and civil
judgments
up to
coverage
limit:

$50,000
$50,000
$100,000
$100,000

$100,000
$250,000
$500,000
$1,000,000

Yearly
Cost

$165
$254
$400
$600

Reimburses legal fees up to combined
coverage limit:
$50,000

$131;
$250
for two
years;
$350
for
three
years

[Vol. 46:1209

Comments

• Applies only to colorable
self-defense, hunting,
trapping, and targetshooting situations.
• Criminal defense
reimbursement only
available in the event of
acquittal or dismissal.
• Civil defense costs do not
apply against coverage
limits.
• Purchased with Lockton
Personal Firearms Liability
Insurance.
• Applies only to shootings
related to a home invasion.
• Coverage for injuries is
limited to $10,000 and
applies against total benefit.
• In criminal situation, covers
fees even if insured is not
acquitted or case is not
dismissed.
• Excludes shootings of
family members, neighbors,
and landlords.
• Not classified as insurance;
coverage is provided as a
benefit of program
membership.
• Benefits may be used to pay
for: bail-bond premium (up
to $4,500), “Aftermath
Cleanup” (up to $2,500),
burial service costs (up to
$4,500).

FORM]; Personal Firearms Liability Insurance for NRA Members, LOCKTON AFFINITY, LLC,
http://www.locktonrisk.com/nrains/excess.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) [hereinafter Lockton
Liability Insurance].
108
LOCKTON LIABILITY FORM, supra note 107; LOCKTON AFFINITY, LLC, SELF-DEFENSE
INSURANCE: AMENDMENT TO PERSONAL FIREARMS LIABILITY POLICY FORM (2013),
available at http://www.locktonrisk.com/nrains/forms/Self-Defense_Certificate_of_Insurance.pdf
[hereinafter LOCKTON SELF-DEFENSE AMENDMENT]; Lockton Liability Insurance, supra note 107; Selfdefense Insurance, LOCKTON AFFINITY, LLC, http://www.locktonrisk.com/nrains/defense.htm (last
visited Apr. 15, 2014). Interestingly, the self-defense amendment to the general policy form underlying
this policy explicitly deletes the intentional-act exclusion for the purposes of self-defense coverage.
LOCKTON SELF-DEFENSE AMENDMENT, supra at 2.
109
Frequently Asked Questions, SECOND DEF. ALLIANCE, http://myseconddefensealliance.com/fa
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Program

Coverage by Potential
Liability Type
Criminal

Civil

Firearms
Pays all legal defense
Legal Defense attorneys’ fees on member’s behalf.
Program
Individual home-state benefits only
Colorado,
Florida,
Couple home-state benefits only
Oklahoma,
and
Multi-state benefits
Texas110
(includes Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia)
Minor children

Yearly
Cost

$131.40111
$240112
$35.40
add’l
per
person

$24
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Comments

• Applies only to shootings
done “to stop a threat”;
excludes “legal
representation . . . [arising
from] . . . the commission
of any crime for which
justification under state law
is inapplicable.”113
• Must use one of the
provider’s attorneys.
• Excludes negligence.
• Excludes appeals.
• Excludes discovery, court
fees, expert fees, and
similar expenses.
• Excludes shootings of
family members and
“dating relationships.”
• Classified as “Legal Service
Contract,” “Legal Service
Plan,” or insurance
depending on state.

III. LIABILITY INSURANCE AS REGULATOR AND COMPENSATOR
Insurance transfers the risk of a fortuitous loss from one party to
another in exchange for a payment of a premium by the transferor to the
transferee.114 In a free market, it benefits both the insured and the insurer,
who presumably will only enter into the insurance contract if it is in their
mutual interests to do so.115
q (last visited Apr. 15, 2014); Member Agreement, SECOND DEF. ALLIANCE,
http://myseconddefensealliance.com/member-agreement (last visited Apr. 15, 2014); Membership
Benefits, SECOND DEF. ALLIANCE, http://myseconddefensealliance.com/benefits (last visited Apr. 15,
2014) (follow link to “Financial and Legal Support”).
110
Choose Your Program, U.S. L. SHIELD, https://www.uslawshield.com/choose-your-program/
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (select applicable state from drop-down menu).
111
The cost in Texas is only $89 per year if the member does not hold a state concealed-carry
permit. Program Details, TEX. L. SHIELD, http://www.texaslawshield.com/protection-for-firearmsowners (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (select “Texas Law Shield Membership Cost” tab).
112
The cost in Texas is only $209 per year if one member holds a state concealed-carry permit
and one does not, and $109 per year if neither holds a state concealed-carry permit. Id.
113
It is unclear whether this exclusion applies in a situation where a self-defense defense fails.
Choose Your Program, supra note 110.
114
See 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1.6 (Steven Plitt et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009); see also 9 id. § 126:29
(defining an “occurrence” in the insurance context).
115
At the most basic level, the insured benefits by replacing a risk of loss with a known payout, or
premium. 1A id. § 8.24. The insurer benefits by charging the insured more than the expected value of
the payout on the insured’s claims. This dynamic can change, however, in an environment where
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The existence of an insurance agreement can create both positive and
negative externalities. An externality is an effect that an activity
undertaken by one individual has on another individual who is not in
control of the activity.116 A negative externality is a public loss from a
private activity; a positive externality is a public gain from the activity.117
This Part examines the potential for gun-owner liability insurance to
benefit those external to the insurance contract by serving both as a source
of compensation for victims and as a “private regulator” of gun violence.
It also discusses some difficulties with compensating and regulating via
liability insurance, and its potential to inhibit desirable behavior.
A. Compensating Shooting Victims Via Insurance
Insurance can compensate victims and, in the process, promote the
goals of the tort system by providing compensation on behalf of tortfeasors
who otherwise cannot pay.118 Unfortunately, most perpetrators of gun
violence are judgment-proof and have few collectible assets.119 Their bad
acts are also unlikely to be covered by insurance: they rarely have liability
coverage, and even if they did, their actions would be excluded from
coverage by their policies’ intentional- or criminal-acts exclusions.120
Thus, in the current context, where the great majority of shootings are
intentional,121 the efficacy of mandatory insurance would seem to depend
on whether intentional shootings are covered. The tort system, however,
provides ways to reclassify some intentional acts, like those arising from
improper storage or entrustment, into negligent ones.122 Many claims that
would otherwise be barred as intentional acts can thus result in tort
liability. Notwithstanding an absence of insurance coverage, tortfeasors
are liable for their intentional and negligent torts.
Nonetheless, “few gun injury claims are actually brought.”123 This
suggests that the individuals who commit intentional shootings and those
on whom courts are willing to impose negligence liability are not those
who own homes or who have the wherewithal to purchase liability
insurance is compulsory.
116
See James M. Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371, 372
(1962).
117
Id. at 374.
118
See Baker & Farrish, supra note 9, at 313.
119
Baker & Swedloff, supra note 9, at 1431–32 & n.90.
120
See Baker & Farrish, supra note 9, at 313; Baker & Swedloff, supra note 9, at 1431–32.
121
See infra note 143 (showing total numbers of accidents, assaults, and incidents of self-harm).
122
There are also mechanisms for reducing the moral hazard associated with covering intentional
acts. See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 9, at 313 (discussing risk-based pricing and underwriting
methods). Still, covering intentional acts is likely undesirable. Many insurance policies exclude
reclassified intentional acts from coverage. See infra note 132.
123
Baker & Swedloff, supra note 9, at 1431.
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insurance. Their insured homes, personal possessions, and financial assets
not otherwise protected by statute would presumably be assets collectible
in a judgment, even if a policy exclusion barred insurance coverage. In
other words, homeowners and those who could afford insurance coverage
in the first instance may both be liable in tort and have assets to levy or
incomes to garnish, but few suits are brought against them.124 This
suggests that this group neither directly causes gun violence nor
negligently enables it.
An insurance mandate would thus seem to further compensation goals
only if it caused some otherwise wholly or partially judgment-proof
shooters to carry insurance—an improbable outcome given that the
shooters are already criminals who are unlikely to worry about getting
insurance even if they could afford it.125
That a great many crime guns—somewhere between 32% and 70%—
are likely to have been stolen illustrates the point.126 In these cases, and in
most jurisdictions, the original owner could be liable if his or her
negligence (in storage, entrustment, or the like) allowed the gun to get into
the wrong hands.127 The primary source of stolen guns is homes,128
implicating homeowners’ and umbrella policies. Few gun-injury suits,
however, are brought against homeowners.129
This suggests that
homeowners are not liable in tort, either because they are storing their guns
properly (which would, of course, be desirable, and diminish the need for
insurance in the first place) or because liability will not attach for some
other reason.130 If they were liable, their having collectible assets should
result in their being sued even if their insurance excluded coverage. That
124
It may be that the presence of an insurance company to efficiently pay a claim would result in
more suits because it would be easier for plaintiffs to recover. Baker & Farrish, supra note 9, at 313.
That depends, however, on the insurer not deploying its superior litigation-defense capabilities against
the claimant, contrary to its almost certain duty to its insured. If the insurer defends its insured, then a
plaintiff would likely have a harder time recovering than in a situation in which the alleged tortfeasor
does not have an insurer’s superior defense capabilities on his or her side. See infra Part IV.B.1; infra
note 290 and accompanying text.
125
Proponents and opponents alike agree that criminals will not insure. See infra Part VI.B.
There may also be self-incrimination problems with requiring criminals who use guns to maintain
insurance if government agencies are allowed access to insurers’ records. See, e.g., Haynes v. United
States, 390 U.S. 85, 100–01 (1968). The Oregon bill, which requires one who possesses a firearm
without the owner’s permission to maintain insurance, may have a similar problem. See supra text
accompanying notes 79, 84.
126
See JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A SURVEY
OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 198–204 (1986).
127
See, e.g., Mark S. Cohen, Proof of Negligent Sale, Entrustment, or Storage of Firearms, 37
AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d, §§ 13, 15, 18, 24 (2013).
128
See WRIGHT & ROSSI, supra note 126, at 206 (noting that 84% of gun thieves stole from a
home).
129
See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 9, at 1431.
130
See infra Part III.C.2.a.
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leaves as potential tort defendants the shooters who used the stolen guns
improperly, and they are not worth pursuing.
In summary, compulsory liability insurance for firearm owners is not
likely to advance the goal of compensating the victims of intentional gun
violence. Exceptions would likely be confined to the rare cases (which
may, to some, justify an insurance mandate) where negligent or criminal,
but judgment-proof, firearm owners purchase insurance.131 Even then,
most recovery would be barred unless intentional acts were covered.132
That still leaves the victims of accidental shootings. Accidental shootings,
however, comprise only a small fraction of total shootings,133 and many of
them are coverable by existing insurance products.134
The next Section examines the potential for firearm-owner liability
insurance to make gun ownership safer.
B. Private Regulation Via Insurance
The goal of insurance-based regulation of an activity is to use the
private marketplace to reduce the negative—and if possible, increase the
positive—externalities associated with that activity. In the case of
firearms, the goal of regulation-via-insurance is to reduce the social costs
of ownership, i.e., criminal and accidental shootings.135 Insurance
regulates most directly by influencing the behavior of insureds. It also
influences governmental regulation.
131
One might consider at this point the possibility that a public fund to compensate shooting
victims, perhaps funded by firearm or ammunition taxes, might succeed where insurance would fail.
The concept is problematic because removing the costs associated with an activity tends to encourage
the activity. For example, one would expect individuals to be less careful with their guns if they knew
that they or their victims would be compensated if they accidentally shot themselves or another.
Analogously, some studies show the presence of automobile insurance is correlated with an increase in
automobile accidents. See infra note 273 and accompanying text. A malicious shooter may be less
concerned with shooting someone if he or she knows that the victim will be compensated by a fund,
and thus less likely to sue the shooter. The government might attempt to seek reimbursement to the
compensation fund from the shooter, but most shooters are judgment proof, see supra note 119 and
accompanying text, which is the reason for having the fund in the first place. The fund would
presumably not pay families following suicides for the same reason that life insurance does not pay in
such cases. See supra note 5. Although a detailed analysis of such an idea is beyond the scope of this
Article and may be suitable for a future work, the point is that, because a compensation fund would
serve as insurance, many of the moral hazard and many of the related incentive problems discussed
herein should be expected to apply in that context as well. See infra Part V.
132
See infra Part III.B.4. Indeed, despite the potential for the tort system to enable claims for
some intentional acts by reclassifying them as negligent ones, many insurance policies exclude
coverage for them.
133
See infra note 143.
134
See supra text accompanying notes 97–100.
135
Harman, supra note 7; Kenney, supra note 2. There is an ongoing debate about whether tort
liability or liability insurance is better at regulating externalities. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 257–79 (2004). As discussed, tort liability is scarce
in this context. See supra Part III.A.

2014]

INSURING AGAINST GUNS?

1231

Insurers are adept at collecting and analyzing data on the frequency of
various activities, and measuring the risk associated with those activities.
This Section describes the ways in which they employ these competencies
to regulate. It also discusses some weaknesses of these methods in the
context of firearm-owner liability.
1. Risk-Based Pricing
Pricing a firearm-liability insurance policy according to factors
associated with an increased risk of shooting can create incentives—lower
premiums—for insureds to take care to minimize those factors.136 Such a
system would necessarily involve penalties—higher premiums—for those
who do not mitigate known risks. For example, if the use of trigger locks
on stored guns is known to decrease the risk of an accidental shooting, then
gun owners who employ trigger locks (and perhaps similar safety devices)
would pay less than gun owners who do not.137 Those who do not practice
safe gun ownership would be expected to have their weapons involved in
more shootings, and their premiums would increase accordingly.
The practice of “experience rating”—basing an insured’s premiums on
prior claim experience—can be effective in motivating a policyholder to
reduce the risk of loss, thus reducing moral hazard.138 It also “quickly
reveals loss characteristics,” which are traits (generally demographics and
place of residence) possessed by would-be insureds likely to have greater
loss activity.139 Insurers, with their superior ability to analyze data and
assess likely loss exposures, can thus charge more to those possessing the
offending attributes.140
Experience rating is especially effective when insurers are able to
accumulate many exposures, allowing them to better forecast expected
losses.141 Its effectiveness wanes, however, when losses are infrequent.142
This may very well be the case with firearms, especially if intentional
shootings are not insured (for which there are strong arguments), where the
number of incidents on which to build a rating system is a fraction of the

136
See Baker & Farrish, supra note 9, at 295; Baker & Swedloff, supra note 9, at 1419; Omri
Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111
MICH. L. REV. 197, 205–07 & n.15 (2012).
137
Some proponents of liability insurance are promoting exactly this. See Bunn, supra note 4.
138
See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 9, at 1419; Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 136, at 206–
07; see also Neil A. Doherty & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Corporate Insurance Strategy: The Case of
British Petroleum, 6 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 4, 11 (1993) (defining moral hazard as “the tendency for
insured parties to exercise less care and thus to experience greater losses than the uninsured”).
139
Doherty & Smith, supra note 138, at 11.
140
See id. at 8, 11; see also Baker & Swedloff, supra note 9, at 1419–20 (“[I]nsurers can collect
and provide loss prevention information that may not be reflected in price differentials.”).
141
Doherty & Smith, supra note 138, at 11.
142
Id.
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143

number available in the automobile context.
Risk-based pricing, including experience rating, may also be
ineffective in influencing insureds’ behavior if actuarially-fair premiums
would be low even for high risks because an increased-but-still-low cost
may not alter one’s behavior. One pair of commentators found that the
actuarially-fair premiums for coverage levels similar to those required for
automobile insurance would be about twenty dollars per year for the
average firearm owner.144 Another commentator placed the figure at about
143
Automobile insurance serves for many as the model for firearm-liability insurance. See supra
text accompanying notes 34, 41, 71. The following tables show fatal and nonfatal injuries in 2010, as
tabulated by the Centers for Disease Control, for firearms and motor vehicles. They do not include
situations where no one was injured or situations where there was legal intervention by a firearm or
motor vehicle to injure a felon.

Motor Vehicles
Accidents
Assaults
Self-Harm

Nonfatal
2,972,717
11,145
2,089

Fatal
35,332
39
114
Grand Total:

Total
3,008,049
11,184
2,203
3,021,436

Firearms
Accidents
Assaults
Self-Harm

Nonfatal
14,161
53,738
4,643

Fatal
606
11,078
19,392
Grand Total:

Total
14,767
64,816
24,035
103,618

Nonfatal Injury Reports, 2001–2011, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/nfirates2001.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (select either
“Unintentional,” “Assault—All,” or “Self-Harm”; then select either “Motor Vehicle Occupant” added
to “Pedestrian,” or “Firearm”; and finally select “2010” and “All Ages”); Fatal Injury Reports,
National and Regional, 1999–2010, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate10_us.html (last visited Apr 15, 2014) (select either
“Unintentional,” “Homicide,” or “Suicide”; then select either “Motor Vehicle, Overall” or “Firearm”;
and finally select “2010” and “All Ages”). Assuming that auto insurers have enough accident data to
properly set rates, and even including intentional injuries, in 2010 there were approximately twentynine times as many data points on which to base auto insurance rates as there would have been to set
firearm-liability rates. Excluding incidents of self-harm would increase the ratio to approximately
thirty-eight times as many. Excluding all intentional incidents would increase the ratio to
approximately 204 times as many data points per year on which to base rates. And this ignores
insurers’ nearly nine decades’ of experience setting rates in the auto context and practically nonexistent
experience setting rates in the firearm context. The number of potential accident claims on which to
build a reliable rating system for firearm-liability insurance may be too small, and in any event not
nearly as robust as that of the automobile-insurance industry, even if intentional shootings are included.
144
Gilles & Lund, supra note 8, at 21, 23 n.34. These commentators also opined that requiring
gun owners to pay more than the actuarially fair amount or to purchase more insurance than is required
of car owners would pose constitutional problems. Id. at 23 n.33. The proposals made to date would
generally have required more coverage than the minimum amount required of drivers. Compare id.
(estimating premiums using the mandatory automobile coverage level of $25,000 per injured person
required by forty-eight states), with supra Part II.B (describing several proposals requiring at least
$250,000 of coverage).
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fifty-seven dollars per year per gun, using data on firearm injuries and
comparisons to automobile claims.145 A study of coverage for gun-related
harm provided by existing insurance products revealed that the presence of
a firearm in the home did not affect the cost of homeowners’ or renters’
insurance, even though most policies cover firearm-liability claims.146
Even “life insurance companies do not appear to consider gun-related risks
in underwriting and pricing their products.”147
The same study’s authors also found that “there are relatively few
instances in which gun-risk businesses are classified differently from other,
similar businesses.”148 They are classified differently only when there
exists greater risk of product liability, commercial crime, fire, and similar
business-driven risk; an increased risk of payout for general firearmliability claims is not a factor, including in situations where firearms are
kept on premises for ready use for security purposes.149 Relatedly, general
liability premiums for establishments open to the public have not increased
after the liberalization of concealed-carry laws.150 Including intentional
acts in coverage, however, would increase the number of shootings
covered by liability insurance, which in turn would likely make the cost of
coverage higher.151 A concept related to risk-based pricing is requiring
insureds to share the cost of claims paid on their behalf.
2. Risk Sharing
Risk sharing refers to the use of deductibles and copayments to share
some of the cost of a claim with the insured. The idea is to preserve some
of the insured’s incentive to take care ex ante by leaving some of his or her
“skin in the game.”152
145
Tom Harvey, Gun Insurance Would Not Be Expensive, GUN INS. BLOG (Jan. 2, 2013),
http://www.guninsuranceblog.com/gun-insurance-would-not-be-expensive/.
146
Baker & Farrish, supra note 9, at 299–300.
147
Id. at 298. All this said, the costs of existing programs for firearm owners are higher than the
estimated figures mentioned in this paragraph. See supra Part II.C. Those programs, however, are
provided by very small operations with relatively large per-insured overhead by comparison to that
which could be expected if a statutory mandate required all gun owners in a state or the nation to
maintain liability insurance. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the development of service efficiencies).
148
Baker & Farrish, supra note 9, at 300.
149
See id. at 301–07, 308–10. Although this study’s analysis of general liability costs for gunrelated businesses is useful to the present analysis, many of the potential claims that it analyzed are
now mooted by the PLCAA. See supra Part II.A.1. To the extent that the PLCAA moots otherwise
cognizable claims, insurance should be even less expensive.
150
Cooper & Walsh, supra note 2.
151
See Baker & Farrish, supra note 9, at 299, 312. It is unknown, however, exactly how many
more shootings would be covered because many—though not all—intentional shootings can already be
re-characterized as negligent ones for insurability purposes. See supra text accompanying notes 97–98;
infra text accompanying note 215. Further, it is unclear how many intentional shooters would carry
insurance. See infra note 323 and accompanying text.
152
See KENNETH J. ARROW, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING 47, 55 (1965); Baker &
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Traditional cost-sharing techniques may be less effective in the firearm
context, however. If gun-liability insurance is to resemble auto liability
insurance, as many suggest,153 then deductibles would not apply.154
Oregon’s proposed liability system, for example, would have explicitly
mandated coverage for intentional acts (which comes with its own
problems155) and made absolute the insurer’s duty to pay, subject to
possible subrogation against the insured.156
Oregon’s concern is
understandable: liability for firearm-related torts against gun owners
already exists, but few claims are brought because most firearm tortfeasors
are judgment proof.157 A risk-sharing mechanism would thus partially,
though perhaps only marginally, undermine one of the purposes for
requiring insurance in the first instance: providing victims with a source of
compensation, at least in theory, for their injuries.158
3. Loss-Prevention Services
Insurers facing claims have incentives to study gun violence and
determine whether there may be effective ways to reduce its frequency and
injuriousness.159 They can pass this loss-minimizing knowledge on to their
insureds and encourage or require compliance with certain loss-prevention
methods, and then monitor compliance with those methods.
Insurers may have an advantage over their insureds in identifying the
best ways to reduce risk of loss if they are able to collect a sufficient
amount of data to apply their data-processing capabilities.160 It is not a
foregone conclusion, however, that this would be feasible in the context of
firearm-related risks.161 Nevertheless, insurers, who also have skin in the
game, have “extra incentive to reach out to insureds” to advise them on

Swedloff, supra note 9, at 1420; Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 136, at 208–09.
153
See Kenney, supra note 2; supra text accompanying notes 34, 41, 71.
154
Baker & Swedloff, supra note 9, at 1429–30.
155
See infra Part V.B.1.a (discussing moral hazard and adverse selection).
156
See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
157
Baker & Swedloff, supra note 9, at 1431–32 n.90.
158
One might argue that this proves too much because a covered tortfeasor’s deductible would be
a small portion of the total payment to the victim, and especially small in relation to the insured’s
wealth. Although these observations may be true, they assume that the tortfeasor is insured in the first
place and that a compensable claim exists. Part VI addresses a mandate’s likely low uptake by gun
owners. Parts III.A and III.C.2.a address the unlikelihood of liability attaching to a gun owner who is
not the criminal shooter, but rather one against whom a negligent storage or similar claim is asserted.
Given that liability rarely attaches to the presumably nonjudgment-proof gun owners in this latter
category, and insurance coverage would therefore not apply, the judgment-proof criminal shooters
remain. On the off chance that such shooters get insurance, any reduction in insurer-paid compensation
should be expected to directly reduce the victim’s payment.
159
See Baker & Farrish, supra note 9, at 312–13.
160
See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 9, at 1421; Doherty & Smith, supra note 138, at 8–9.
161
See Kochenburger, supra note 5, at 1285; supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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162

loss-prevention methods.
To reduce their losses, they may fund or
conduct research to identify claim-reducing strategies.163
Insurers may insist that their insureds both implement their findings
and consent to compliance monitoring.164 As with other individual
mandates, however, such monitoring would be very intrusive, requiring
“routine, appropriately timed, and frequent” in-home inspections to ensure
that, among other things, applications have been completed truthfully, no
new firearms have been acquired (if insurance is on a per-firearm basis165 ),
and loss-prevention requirements have been complied with.166 This would
be offensive to many,167 and would make enforcing compliance with the
loss-prevention methods exceptionally difficult.168
4. Refusal to Insure
A corollary to mandating loss-prevention activities is the refusal to
insure if those activities are not implemented by the insured.169 Closely
related is the refusal to provide coverage for certain types of losses.170 The
excluded losses are typically those “for which coverage would create a
severe moral hazard and where noncoverage is the only effective way to
create harm-prevention incentives.”171 The quintessential excluded losses
are those arising from intentional harmful activity.172
Refusal to insure may be problematic for two somewhat opposing
reasons. First, one of the major stated goals of the proposals in question is
to reduce, or at least provide compensation to the victims of, unjustified
shootings.173 Although as a matter of public policy, one cannot ordinarily
insure against one’s own intentional acts, some legislative proposals
162

Baker & Swedloff, supra note 9, at 1422.
See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 136, at 212.
164
See Baker & Farrish, supra note 9, at 295, 312–13; Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 136, at
211–12; Doherty & Smith, supra note 138, at 8.
165
See supra notes 44, 49, 55, 62, 72, 82, 93 and accompanying text.
166
Cf. Sherry A. Glied et al., Consider It Done? The Likely Efficacy of Mandates for Health
Insurance, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1612, 1618–19 (2007) (drawing from experiences with health and
other forms of insurance to discuss factors that lead to compliance with individual mandates).
167
Cf. Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 282 (1996)
(referring to “increased social control” by insurers).
168
See Baker & Farrish, supra note 9, at 314; see also Harman, supra note 7 (noting that
monitoring is easier in the automobile context because insurers know about the safety devices built into
cars).
169
Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 136, at 209. An insurer can also charge more if
nonmandatory loss-prevention activities are not complied with. This is discussed with risk-based
pricing, supra Part III.B.1.
170
Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 136, at 215.
171
Id.; see infra Part V.B.1.a (delineating why insurance and subrogation cannot be rationally
applied to criminal gun violence).
172
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 17, at 440–41; Baker & Farrish, supra note 9, at 296; BenShahar & Logue, supra note 136, at 215.
173
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
163
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discussed earlier would have explicitly mandated such coverage.174 Other
proposals presumably intended to cover harm from unintentional behavior,
like negligent storage or entrustment, that leads to an intentional shooting.
Thus, the coverage exclusions needed for insurance to function as an
effective regulator either would be disallowed under the mandating
statute,175 or would subvert the underlying goal of covering as many
shootings as possible. The second issue with regulating-via-refusing-toinsure is that it serves as part of a problematic (in this context) gatekeeping
function, which is discussed next.
5. Gatekeeping
When insurance is a prerequisite for another activity, insurers regulate
by serving as gatekeepers of that activity.176 “Going through the gate
requires meeting the insurance companies’ standards [e.g., complying with
an insurer’s loss-prevention requirements], as well as paying the necessary
premiums. This gatekeeping role gives insurance companies the potential
to serve as significant regulators (while at the same time making access to
‘private’ insurance an intensely ‘public’ issue).”177 At the extreme,
insurers can effectively make illegal a gated activity for which insurance is
mandated by not offering any coverage.
Given that none of the heretofore-proposed firearm-liability regimes
would have specifically required that insurers provide the mandated
coverage,178 such de facto illegality is a real concern. Preventing access to
firearms by those who cannot meet an insurer-imposed loss-prevention
standard or afford a premium may “help curb the tendency of some people
to obtain arms for insubstantial reasons.”179 Indeed, many individuals,
including the sponsors of some proposed coverage systems, have
acknowledged that they support a firearm-liability-insurance mandate
because it would inhibit gun ownership.180 The theory is that it would do
174

See supra text accompanying notes 48, 54, 79, 90 (describing proposed statutes in Washington,
D.C., Illinois, Oregon, and Pennsylvania). But see supra text accompanying note 91 (exempting
intentional but illegal acts from the Pennsylvania statute).
175
This would defeat the ability to regulate by refusing to insure and result in increased moral
hazard, which may in turn lead to more shootings. See infra Part V.B.1.a.
176
Baker & Farrish, supra note 9, at 294.
177
Id. at 295.
178
See supra Part II.B.
179
Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39
ALA. L. REV. 103, 128 (1987). But see supra text accompanying notes 144–145 (discussing the
potentially low cost of the insurance).
180
See, e.g., Kenney, supra note 2; Wasik, supra note 2; supra note 42 and accompanying text;
see also Baker & Farrish, supra note 9, at 313 (noting in connection with homeowners’ policies that
“owning a gun could lead to a premium surcharge, which could remove some guns from circulation”);
Richard Harris, A Reporter at Large: Handguns, NEW YORKER, July 26, 1976, at 53, 57–58 (quoting
Nelson Shields, co-founder of National Council to Control Handguns, as saying, “Our ultimate goal—
total control of handguns in the United States—is going to take time. . . . The first problem is to slow
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so selectively, making ownership impossible only for the highest risks
whom insurers do not want to cover.181
But regulation via gatekeeping can implicate constitutional concerns
now that the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right to own a firearm.182 The government’s
delegating to a private party the ability to determine who can exercise a
constitutional right is troublesome. Constitutional overreach by a private
party to whom governmental gatekeeping powers have been delegated
should be as problematic as direct governmental overreach.183 It should
likewise be unacceptable for the government to impose a locked gate (i.e.,
an insurance requirement in the absence of insurers to write the coverage)
between an individual and his or her rights.
States can require licensed insurers, as a condition of offering a given
coverage line within their borders, to include firearm-liability coverage in
that line’s policies.184 States cannot, however, either require insurers to
write stand-alone firearm-liability insurance as a condition of writing other
lines, or force insurers to operate within their borders.185 Making liability
coverage a prerequisite for firearm ownership without ensuring the
availability of the insurance may thus create an effective ban on firearm
ownership.186 Such an effective ban is likely impermissible.187
If an insurer can set higher standards for insurability than the
government, it can “prohibit you from getting insurance and a gun—if
down the increasing number of handguns being produced and sold in this country. . . . And the final
problem is to make possession of all handguns and all handgun ammunition . . . totally illegal”).
181
See Wasik, supra note 2. A state could require an insurer to “take all comers,” or not deny any
applicant coverage. The cost of insurance that an insurer would ordinarily deem too high a risk to write
is certain to be very high, which may also be problematic. See infra text accompanying note 197.
182
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622, 636 (2008).
183
Cf. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 77, 85, 88 (1980) (denying a private
property owner’s ability to curtail free speech in a public shopping center); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501, 505, 507, 509 (1946) (prohibiting a private firm from committing civil rights violations in a
company-owned town because such violations would be unconstitutional if committed by the
government in an ordinary town). But see Lund, supra note 179, at 128 (arguing that the private
insurance market would be effective in regulating where the government could not).
184
Kochenburger, supra note 5, at 1292.
185
Id.
186
See supra text accompanying notes 30, 37, 59, 66, 96 and text following notes 39, 43, 52.
Although a state’s insurance department may have the authority to mandate coverage, only four of the
proposed statutes explicitly empower their departments to do so. See supra text accompanying notes
47, 68, 78, 89. Unsympathetic insurance regulators could also make it difficult for an insurer to write
the requisite coverage.
187
See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 711 (7th Cir. 2011) (declaring unconstitutional a
municipal ordinance that required training at a shooting range in order to lawfully possess a firearm
while simultaneously banning shooting ranges). If states mandate insurance and no insurance is
available, they may offer the insurance themselves, infra text accompanying notes 194–197, or drop the
mandate, in which case the situation is back at the status quo ante. It may be that some mandates did
not pass because insurers made clear that they did not want to offer the coverage.
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188

[the] insurer deems you uninsurable.”
This may be a problem in and of
itself if the burden is high enough. It is likely to be impermissible if the
condition for insurability is one that infringes an explicitly recognized
constitutional right.189 Such would be the case, for example, if the
prerequisite for owning a firearm were insurance and the prerequisite for
obtaining the insurance were the employment of trigger locks or other
devices that render a firearm inoperable.190 The Supreme Court expressly
struck down a statute with such a requirement because it effectively made
self-defense too difficult.191
Even if an insurer does not deny coverage when an insured fails to
follow its loss-prevention guidelines, it may want to charge a high
premium for coverage. This may be a legitimate decision from the
insurer’s standpoint if its actuarial calculations justify such a rate. It may,
however, be an intentional effort by lawmakers and regulators to price out
of the market those who are otherwise qualified to own a firearm. By
setting high minimum coverage requirements or simply regulating rates,
insurers would be “creating a permanent cost with owning each gun.”192
Although the latter case—where legitimate would-be gun owners are
priced out of the market by design—is likely more offensive,193 both are de
facto bars to the legitimate exercise of a right and should receive the same
treatment as outright gatekeeping-driven refusals to insure.
One solution to the unwillingness or inability of insurers to cover
otherwise-qualified would-be firearm owners might be for the state to
insure the residual market.194 Governments generally provide for residual
188

Wasik, supra note 2; see also Lund, supra note 179, at 128 (“[T]he private insurance market
would quickly and efficiently make it prohibitively expensive for people with a record of irresponsible
ownership of guns to possess them legally . . . .”).
189
See Gilles & Lund, supra note 8, at 21 (“The state’s burden of justification should be a heavy
one when it places greater burdens on the exercise of a constitutional right than on the exercise of a
non-constitutional right that involves very similar trade-offs between individual and social interests.”).
190
See supra text accompanying notes 35, 70.
191
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630, 635 (2008).
192
Pawar, supra note 5; see Gilles & Lund, supra note 8, at 21; Wasik, supra note 2. Ironically,
the priced-out individuals may have the greatest need for the protection that a gun affords.
193
See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995) (striking down a
ban on federal employees accepting honoraria, implemented without invidious purpose, because it
placed a significant financial burden on free-speech rights). But compare Hunter v. Underwood, 471
U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (striking down, on equal-protection grounds, a facially neutral provision in the
Alabama Constitution that was intentionally designed to disenfranchise Black voters), with Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270–71 (1977) (declining to hold
unconstitutional, on equal-protection grounds, a zoning decision with a discriminatory impact where no
discriminatory purpose was shown).
194
The residual market is typically thought of as that group of would-be insureds that private
insurers are unwilling or unable to cover, but which it is decided as a matter of policy should
nonetheless have access to coverage. Sometimes the government will insure these risks, sometimes the
cost is spread among a state’s insurers as a whole, and sometimes a combination of both methods is
used. See Residual Markets, INS. INFO. INST. (2013), http://www.iii.org/issues_updates/residual-
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markets as a matter of policy; because they are attempting to regulate a
constitutional right, however, they may be required to do so as a
prerequisite to mandating firearm-liability insurance. In addition, if
insurers are forced to bear some of the cost of insuring the residual
market,195 passing the costs on to their other insureds may once again be
problematic.196 Thus, in the end, the states may have to bear the costs of
insuring the residual market, or at least subsidize premiums enough so that
the insurance requirement is not overly burdensome. State subsidies, in
turn, would once again run contrary to the avowed regulatory goal of
passing the costs of firearm injuries on to firearm owners. It is inherently
contradictory to the goals of a firearm-liability-insurance mandate that
those whose policies would be subsidized would also presumably be the
high risks that mandatory insurance would price out of the market.197
6. Ex Post Underwriting
Ex post underwriting “consists of refusing to pay out claims based on
policies that were issued after the insured materially misrepresented some
information at the underwriting phase.”198 In theory, because an ex post
refusal to pay a claim would mean that an insured would have to pay it, the
insured should have great incentive to provide truthful information up
front. Regulating via ex post underwriting, however, would work against
the goals of mandating firearm insurance for similar reasons as would risk
sharing: it would reduce the compensation available to victims by changing
the situation from one in which there may be a payment, at least in theory,
to the status quo of there being none in practice.199
7. Influencing Public Regulation
The previous methods of regulation via insurance involved modifying
the behavior of insureds to reduce losses. Another key way in which
insurers regulate is by influencing public regulation.200 Not surprisingly:
markets.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014); see also Harman, supra note 7 (asking whether “the state of
Massachusetts [is] willing to become a big insurer of weapons”).
195
See Residual Markets, supra note 194 (“Residual market programs are rarely self-sufficient.
Where the rates charged to high-risk policyholders are too low to support the program’s operation,
insurers are generally assessed to make up the difference.”).
196
Gilles & Lund, supra note 8, at 20.
197
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
198
Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 136, at 215–16.
199
See supra notes 119–120, 157. Although there are ways in theory to restore some of the
incentive without sacrificing compensation—like subrogating against insureds (by levying their assets
or garnishing their wages)—these mechanisms should only be expected to function if they would also
be expected to operate properly in the tort environment, absent insurance.
200
Baker & Swedloff, supra note 9, at 1423–24; Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 136, at 213.
Insurers can also encourage the private market—gun manufacturers, makers of storage devices, etc.—
to make their products safer.
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A liability insurance industry responsible for paying millions
of dollars in gun-related claims in any given year would have
an incentive to learn more about gun violence and, if it
determined that there were cost-effective prevention
measures, to impose those prevention measures on
insureds . . . through engagement with public regulators.201
For example, insurers may lobby legislators or regulatory agencies to
require that firearms that are not in use be stored with trigger locks.202
The marginal effect of insurer involvement in such lobbying may be
less than expected. First, the United States already has a robust guncontrol lobby that actively seeks restrictions on firearm ownership and use.
Second, the actual effect on overall safety of such insurer-driven
regulations is questionable; for example, the verdict is still out in the area
of automobile regulation, where insurers have lobbied actively.203 Third,
insurers may have a monetary incentive to lobby for regulations that would
increase claims, as long as the claims become more predictable, because
they can then charge higher premiums;204 more claims mean more and/or
more severe injuries. Finally, a common goal of insurer regulation-vialobbying—often characterized as “reform”—is the implementation of
liability caps,205 which would have the same undesired effect of reducing
the ability of insurance to compensate as some of the insured-focused
private regulation discussed above.
***
Liability for firearm torts already exists in the absence of insurance.
The calls for mandating that firearm owners purchase liability insurance
imply that some believe that insurance could deter gun violence where the
tort system has been unable to.206 Yet, the traditional methods by which
insurance regulates are likely to be less effective in the instant context.
Risk-based pricing and loss-prevention services may have some positive,
but ultimately marginal, effects. Mandating loss-prevention activities
would also be difficult to monitor and enforce. Putting some or all of the
201

Baker & Farrish, supra note 9, at 312–13.
See 38 R.C.N.Y. § 1-05(n)(3) (2013) (requiring that “[a]ll rifles and shotguns shall not be
readily capable of firing”). Such a requirement may be unconstitutional. See supra notes 190–191 and
accompanying text.
203
See infra Part V.A.
204
See Robert Kneuper & Bruce Yandle, Auto Insurers and the Air Bag, 61 J. RISK & INS. 107,
110–11 (1994) (describing this as the reason that auto insurers favored mandatory air-bag laws while
only lukewarmly supporting mandatory seat-belt laws, and why life and health insurers did not support
air-bag requirements despite (or because of) an estimated $1.1 billion reduction in life-insurance costs).
205
Baker & Farrish, supra note 9, at 296, 311.
206
This assumes that the calls are genuine. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
202
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liability onto insureds via risk sharing, refusing to insure, ex post
underwriting, and gatekeeping would undermine the compensatory goals
of insurance by moving liability back to those who cannot bear it in the
first place. Gatekeeping also faces potential constitutional difficulties,
which may result in government subsidy of at least some individuals’
insurance. Finally, insurer influence on government regulation is unlikely
to have a positive impact on gun violence, and it may have a negative one.
This Section outlined some concerns about the ability of insurance to
make gun ownership safer and to remunerate heretofore uncompensated
victims of gun violence. The next Section discusses other concerns
relating to addressing gun violence via insurance.
C. Collateral Concerns About Remedying Gun Violence Via Insurance
This Section surveys some potential collateral issues with mandating
liability insurance for firearm owners. It does not intend to be a
comprehensive analysis, but rather a partial list of items that lawmakers
should consider before mandating gun-owner liability insurance.
1. Insuring in the Absence of a Market
Other than a few small-scale programs and the coverage that is
provided as a part of homeowners’ and renters’ insurance, a liabilityinsurance market specifically for firearm owners does not exist.207 As the
President of the Insurance Information Institute has noted, “It’s easier to
write such laws than to actually put them into practice.”208 States have
limited ability to compel insurers to write firearm-liability insurance within
their borders.209 High compliance costs would mean that there would be
little profit or financial gain for insurers, at least at the outset and if they
charge otherwise actuarially-fair premiums.210
Inexperience in the market would likely lead to similar problems.
Insurance works by pooling risk, so “there is little experience—that is,
there is no data—for either carriers or regulators to analyze and evaluate
the underwriting and claims experience for this type of coverage.”211 This
inexperience would make it impossible for insurers or insurance regulators
to make coverage available212 in the timeframes—as low as zero or thirty
207

Harman, supra note 7; see supra Part II.C.
Harman, supra note 7.
209
See supra notes 184–185 and accompanying text.
210
See Kochenburger, supra note 5, at 1285. Insurers would likely want to build a cushion into
their pricing to compensate for the uncertainty arising out of insuring a risk that they have little
experience pricing on a large scale.
211
Hearing on B. 20-170, supra note 97.
212
The inexperience would interfere with their readiness in creating and approving standard
forms, attempting to set pricing, etc. One proposed statute would have made the State Police
responsible for implementation of its mandate. See supra text accompanying note 58. It is difficult to
208
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days in some cases—that most of the statutes proposed thus far would have
required.213 Such timeframes would also make it difficult for purchasers to
compare coverage options.
2. Pointless or Duplicate Coverage
Although there is little market experience on which to base firearmowner liability coverage, there are some instances where insurance is
unnecessary either because the law does not recognize any underlying
liability or because coverage already exists.
a. Lack of a Claim to Cover
There are some otherwise insurable situations in which liability cannot
attach or where alternate coverage already exists. For handguns, the CSLA
has created a safe-storage incentive better than any private insurer could
hope: if a handgun is stored with a secure gun storage or safety device, its
owner receives near-total immunity from liability.214
For other storage circumstances, it is uncertain that liability coverage
would catalyze the tort system to address the criminal shootings that
chiefly motivate calls for mandatory insurance, even considering tort law’s
ability to convert some intentional shootings into negligent ones for
liability purposes.215 Negligent entrustment claims are recognized by most
jurisdictions,216 as are negligent storage claims, where a minor gets hold of
a firearm.217 But many jurisdictions (including some that have considered
mandatory-coverage statutes) will not recognize a claim for negligent
storage where the firearm falls into an adult’s hands218 especially where the
acquired firearm is stolen from a legal owner and subsequently used for
criminal activity.219 Even where liability is recognized, “the degree of care
imagine how a police agency can implement an insurance statute, suggesting that the goals of the
statute may be to hamper firearm ownership or make it impossible. Such a purpose is likely
constitutionally problematic. See supra text accompanying note 182.
213
See supra text accompanying notes 53, 61, 65, 76, 95. Such short implementation deadlines
again suggest that the purpose of the statutes in question may be the troublesome purpose of inhibiting
gun ownership. See Kenney, supra note 2. A 180-day or longer deadline would be more tenable. See
supra text accompanying notes 31, 88.
214
See supra Part II.A.2.
215
See supra text accompanying notes 97–98, 122, 151.
216
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 127, §§ 20–24.
217
See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, Armed and Dangerous: Tort Liability for the Negligent Storage
of Firearms, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1189, 1217 (2000) (“Numerous courts have held that gun owners may
be liable for negligent storage where a child obtains a gun and uses it accidentally to cause harm.”).
Some jurisdictions have passed child-access-prevention (“CAP”) laws that make it a crime, with some
exceptions, to allow minors to access stored firearms. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 893, 899;
McClurg, supra, at 1202–03. Violation of such a law may lead to negligence per se liability.
218
See, e.g., Brisco v. Fuller, 623 So. 2d 196, 198 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Richardson v. Crawford,
No. 10-11-00089-CV, 2011 WL 4837849, at *8 (Tex. App. Oct. 12, 2011).
219
In these jurisdictions, criminal activity is seen as a superseding intervening cause of the
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demanded by some courts is so lax as to amount to no duty at all,” and of
the courts that “have approved liability in stolen gun cases, . . . almost all
of them involve situations where the assailant who ‘stole’ the gun was a
member of the household where the gun was stored.”220 In other words,
the kinds of would-be negligence claims that are most naturally linked to
the primary target of mandatory firearm insurance proposals—firearm
crime, much of which is committed with stolen weapons221 —fall outside
the scope of tort liability in most jurisdictions. This does not bode well for
insurance’s ability to compensate or regulate in these areas.
Jurisdictions recognizing the doctrines of contributory negligence and
modified comparative fault may see a further reduced number of
compensable claims,222 especially considering that a substantial proportion
of shooting victims are shot during the commission of a crime.223 Of the
shooting. Thus, absent a special relationship to the victim or other circumstances to put the gun owner
on special notice, the owner’s alleged negligence in storing a gun cannot be a proximate cause of harm
caused by a third party’s criminal misuse of it. See, e.g., Jones v. Secord, 684 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.
2012); Romero v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 749 F.2d 77, 79, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Bloxham v. Glock Inc., 53
P.3d 196, 201 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 885 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002);
Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 727 A.2d 947, 950–51 (Md. 1999); Lelito v. Monroe, 729 N.W.2d 564,
566–67 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006); Finocchio v. Mahler, 37 S.W.3d 300, 303–04 (Mo. Ct. App 2000);
Strever v. Cline, 924 P.2d 666, 670–74 (Mont. 1996); Blunt v. Klapproth, 707 A.2d 1021, 1030–31
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); Bridges v. Parrish, 742 S.E.2d 794, 796–97 (N.C. 2013); Louria v.
Brummett, 916 S.W.2d 929, 930–31 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); Ambrosio v. Carter’s Shooting Ctr., Inc.,
20 S.W.3d 262, 269 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); Raymond v. Craig, No. 67339-4-I, 2012 WL 5897607, at
*5–6 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2012); McGrane v. Cline, 973 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999);
see also Johnstone v. City of Albuquerque, 145 P.3d 76, 83 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that suicide,
like criminal activity, is a supervening intervening cause); At PGNH’s Request, the Senate Judiciary
Committee Voted to Kill HB388—a Well-Intentioned Bill with Unintended Consequences,
PGNH (May 22, 2013), http://www.pgnh.org/at_pgnhs_request_the_senate_judiciary_committee_vote
d_to_kill_hb388_a_well_intentioned_bill_with_unintended_consequences (calling attention to a
withdrawn New Hampshire bill that would have provided that “[n]o person who stores or leaves on
premises under that person’s control a loaded or unloaded firearm shall be held liable in a subsequent
civil case for the criminal acts of another person who illegally obtains possession or control of such
firearm and uses such firearm in the commission of a felony or a misdemeanor”). The jurisdictions not
listed immediately above either more easily allow negligent firearm storage claims or did not have
obvious case law on the topic. In any case, “the ‘no liability’ cases outnumber the ‘pro liability’ cases.”
McClurg, supra note 217, at 1236.
Suicide is almost always viewed as a superseding intervening cause. E.g., Chalhoub v. Dixon,
788 N.E.2d 164, 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Estate of Cummings v. Davie, 40 A.3d 971, 974–75 (Me.
2012); Johnstone, 145 P.3d at 83. But see McClurg, supra note 217, at 1224 (noting that special
knowledge of the victim’s potential for suicide may lead to an enhanced duty to store carefully); id. at
1224 n.267 (noting the same in the negligent entrustment context).
220
McClurg, supra note 217, at 1220–21, 1234.
221
See supra text accompanying note 126.
222
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 127, § 28. Suicides are all but certain to be noncompensible in
contributory-negligence and modified-comparative-fault jurisdictions—it is unlikely that a firearm
owner would be more culpable than the unfortunate victim. A pure comparative-fault system may
allow for some blame to fall on a stolen firearm’s owner if special circumstances are present. See
McClurg, supra note 217, at 1220–21, 1234.
223
See Marianne W. Zawitz & Kevin J. Strom, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
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jurisdictions that have proposed firearm-owner insurance regimes, the
District of Columbia and Maryland follow the pure contributorynegligence approach to torts,224 and Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts,
and Pennsylvania follow the modified approach that bars negligence
liability if the plaintiff is more than fifty percent at fault.225 Assumptionof-risk doctrines may bar still more claims, particularly in cases of hunting
and other shooting-sport accidents.226 While some situations cannot result
in a coverable claim because background tort law precludes liability,
indirect coverage for the harms caused by many shootings already exists.
b. Redundant Coverage
Homeowners’ and renters’ insurance, and the associated umbrella
policies that can be purchased to increase their limits, cover general
liability (as opposed to merely liability associated with the home),
including that arising from negligent shootings.227 Although some of these
policies exclude coverage for the types of claims at issue, some firearmfriendly and “self-defense friendly” insurers will likely continue to cover
shootings arising from the policyholder’s negligence.228
Health insurance will also compensate the costs of treatment for one’s
gunshot injuries, albeit often with a copayment or deductible. With the
“individual responsibility requirement” of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act having come online, millions more individuals are
JUSTICE, FIREARM INJURY AND DEATH FROM CRIME, 1993–97, at 4 (2000) (noting that, of the one-third
of firearm-homicides where it was recorded, “19% [of victims] were killed during the commission of
another crime”); see also MILWAUKEE HOMICIDE REVIEW COMM’N, 2011 HOMICIDES AND NONFATAL
SHOOTINGS: DATA REPORT FOR MILWAUKEE, WI 24 (2012) (showing that 62% of homicide victims
had six or more arrests, and that the median number of arrests was eight); Gilles & Lund, supra note 8,
at 19 n.11 (“[P]ersons engaging in life-threatening violent behavior are heavily embedded in a general
pattern of criminal behavior; crime is a part of their general lifestyle.” (quoting Delbert S. Elliot, LifeThreatening Violence is Primarily a Crime Problem: A Focus on Prevention, 69 U. COLO. L. REV.
1081, 1091 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jo Craven McGinty, New York Killers, and
Those Killed, by Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2006, at A1 (observing that, of the 1,662 murders
committed in New York City from 2003 through 2005, “[m]ore than 90 percent of the killers had
criminal records; and of those who wound up killed, more than half had them”).
224
See Wingfield v. People’s Drug Store, Inc., 379 A.2d 685, 687–88 (D.C. 1977); Coleman v.
Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 69 A.3d 1149, 1150 (Md. 2013). The other states are Alabama, North
Carolina, and Virginia. See Alabama Power Co. v. Schotz, 215 So.2d 447, 452 (Ala. 1968); Smith v.
Fiber Controls Corp., 268 S.E.2d 504, 510 (N.C. 1980); Baskett v. Banks, 45 S.E.2d 173 (Va. 1947).
225
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h(b) (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 231, § 85 (2013); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 7102(a) (2013); Lazenby v. Mark’s Constr., 923 N.E.2d 735, 747 (Ill. 2010). Thirtythree states follow a 50% or 51% comparative-fault system. MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C.,
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE/COMPARATIVE FAULT LAWS IN ALL 50 STATES 3–6 (2013), available at
http://www.mwl-law.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/contributory-negligence-comparative-faultlaws-in-all-50-states.pdf.
226
See 79 AM. JUR. 2d Weapons and Firearms § 45 (2013).
227
See supra notes 97, 100 and accompanying text. Recall that some intentional shootings can be
reclassified as ones arising from negligence. See supra text accompanying notes 97, 122.
228
See MONGE, supra note 100, at 39, 43.
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229

expected to be covered by health insurance.

3. Discouraging Honest—and Beneficial—Gun Ownership
Just as there are situations where it may appear desirable to use
mandatory insurance to deter or account for the costs of gun ownership,
and others where coverage would be pointless or duplicative, there is some
gun ownership with which insurance should not interfere. As one
economist reasoned:
Adding the cost of insurance would further discourage honest
gun ownership. That would make matters worse, not better.
And is it so obvious that all guns are harmful to others and
that gun ownership should be made more expensive to every
owner? When an honest, law-abiding citizen uses a gun in
self-defense, it often protects those nearby who are unarmed.
Perhaps gun ownership should be subsidized for honest
people. I don’t think this is a good idea, but raising the cost
of gun ownership, particularly for good and honest people
who are likely to use a gun only in self-defense, is not a free
lunch. . . . [L]iability insurance makes gun ownership more
expensive for honest, law-abiding people while encouraging
dishonest and dangerous people to own guns in ways we
cannot see.230
The detrimental effect of discouraging beneficial firearm ownership
may be substantial. Estimates drawn from studies directly measuring the
yearly number of defensive gun uses (“DGUs”) that thwart a criminal
attack (against the gun user or someone else) range from about 770,000 to
over 3,000,000.231 Another trio of commentators, using a Census Bureau
survey of crime victimization that did not directly ask about defensive gun
use, still inferred 108,000 DGUs.232 Yet another study, which used
229
Relative to pre-Affordable Care Act figures, the number of uninsured nonelderly individuals is
expected to be lower by 14 million, 20 million, 26 million, and eventually 30 million by 2014, 2015,
2016, and 2022, respectively. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE
PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION
13, tbl.3 (2013). The share of the nonelderly population that is insured is expected to increase from
80% in 2012 to 89% in 2022. Id. tbl.3.
230
Kenney, supra note 2 (quoting economist Russ Roberts, John and Jean DeNault Research
Fellow at the Hoover Institution).
231
See JOHNSON ET AL., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS
AND POLICY, ch. 12, at 16 tbl.12-2 (online chapters forthcoming 2014) (manuscript on file with author)
(describing thirteen studies [hereinafter “Thirteen Studies”] that estimated 764,036; 771,043; 777,1553;
1,098,409; 1,414,544; 1,460,000; 1,487,342; 1,621,377; 1,797,461; 2,141,512; 2,549,862; 3,052,717;
and 3,609,682 DGUs annually).
232
Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & David Hemenway, The Gun Debate’s New Mythical Number:
How Many Self-Defense Uses Per Year?, 16 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 463, 468 (1997); see also
JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 231, ch.12, at 15 (noting that applying Cook, Ludwig, and Hemenway’s
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previous studies as starting points, estimated a range of 256,500 to
1,210,000 DGUs per year.233
Even the lowest of these yearly figures is about equal to the number of
yearly firearm injuries.234 The most trustworthy estimates, closer to
700,000 DGUs,235 dwarf the number of firearm injuries. While almost all
DGUs can fairly be expected to prevent a crime, not all will prevent an
injury or protect property. Nevertheless, one study found that almost thirty
percent of defenders believed that, had they not thwarted their attackers
with a firearm, someone “almost certainly” or “probably” would have lost
his or her life.236 Studies have also found substantially lower injury and

methodology to the most recent version of the National Crime Victimization Survey would yield about
97,000 DGUs annually). Studies based on underlying surveys that did not ask directly about DGUs,
such as the Cook, Ludwig, and Hemenway study, have been criticized on that basis. See id. at 15.
Interestingly, and graciously, Cook, Ludwig & Hemenway acknowledged that the main DGU
estimate that they sought to discredit, Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The
Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 184 tbl.2
(1995) (one of the Thirteen Studies, estimating 2,549,862 DGUs), “was calculated by researchers
affiliated with a major research university . . . using widely accepted methods and published in a
topflight, peer-reviewed criminology journal,” and that “[t]heir survey appears to have been conducted
according to current standards, and the results have been reproduced in several subsequent surveys.”
Cook, Ludwig & Hemenway, supra, at 464. Another commentator opined that:
I am as strong a gun-control advocate as can be found among the criminologists in
this country. . . . I would eliminate all guns from the civilian population and maybe
even from the police. I hate guns. . . .
Nonetheless, the methodological soundness of the current Kleck and Gertz study is
clear. . . .
The Kleck and Gertz study impresses me for the caution the authors exercise and the
elaborate nuances they examine methodologically. I do not like their conclusions
that having a gun can be useful, but I cannot fault their methodology. They have
tried earnestly to meet all objections in advance and have done exceedingly well.
Marvin E. Wolfgang, A Tribute to a View I Have Long Opposed, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 188,
188 (1995).
Cook and Ludwig also conducted a separate study in which they estimated 1.46 million DGUs
annually. PHILIP COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA: RESULTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE
NATIONAL SURVEY OF FIREARMS OWNERSHIP AND USE 62–63 tbl.6.2 (1996). They argued, however,
that that their results were implausibly high and that it was impossible to accurately measure DGUs.
Id. at 68–75.
233
See Tom W. Smith, A Call for a Truce in the DGU War, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1462, 1468 (1997) (using as its starting points the DGU estimates arrived at in Cook, Ludwig &
Hemenway, supra note 232, at 468, and Kleck & Gertz, supra note 232, at 184, tbl.2). Perhaps not
coincidentally, the midpoint of Smith’s range, 733,000, is close to the low end of the figures obtained
in the Thirteen Studies directly asking about DGUs. Id.
234
Compare supra note 143 (listing the total number of firearm injuries for 2010 at 103,618), with
text accompanying note 232 (presenting a study estimating 108,000 DGUs annually).
235
See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 231, ch.12, at 4; Smith, supra note 233, at 1468.
236
Kleck & Gertz, supra note 232, at 176. Recall that even those favoring gun control
acknowledge the soundness of this study’s methods. See Wolfgang, supra note 232, at 191–92.
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property-loss rates among gun-using crime victims.
Defensive gun use thus creates positive externalities. It should not be
discouraged. By targeting all firearm owners, however, that is what an
insurance mandate is likely to do. Indeed, just as an argument can be made
that firearm owners should account to victims and society for the costs of
their firearms, one can be made that defenders who prevent crime should
be compensated for the injury that they forestall and the value that they
save. In fact, private firearm use against criminals can be more effective
and safer for third parties than police firearm use; private gun owners are
more likely to thwart criminal attacks and less than one-fifth as likely as
police to shoot an innocent person mistakenly thought to be a criminal.238
In sum, great care should be taken before inhibiting the societal
benefits of positive firearm use. It is, as is the aspiration for gun-owner
liability insurance, essentially a functional form of private regulation.239
IV. LIABILITY INSURANCE AS ENABLER
The previous Part discussed the role of liability insurance as a loss
compensator and private regulator, and highlighted some shortcomings of
237
PRIORITIES FOR RESEARCH TO REDUCE THE THREAT OF FIREARM-RELATED VIOLENCE 15–16
(2013) (Alan I. Leshner et al. eds., 2013); see, e.g., FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW
115–16 (Charles F. Wellford et al. eds., 2005) (stating that defending with a gun reduces the probability
of injury in assaults and robberies by 49% and 46%, respectively, and property loss in robberies by
83%, versus not defending, and that resisting without a gun is substantially more likely to lead to injury
than not resisting at all). The former report was ordered by President Barack Obama and
commissioned by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). PRIORITIES FOR RESEARCH
TO REDUCE THE THREAT OF FIREARM-RELATED VIOLENCE, supra, at 11–12. The latter report was
developed by the National Academies at the request of a consortium of federal agencies and private
foundations, including the CDC and the Joyce Foundation, both of which have historically “taken
positions strongly favoring increased gun control.” JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 231, ch.12, at 2.
238
See Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, “Shall Issue”: The New Wave of Concealed
Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 733 (1995); Don B. Kates, Jr., The Value of Civilian
Handgun Possession as Deterrent to Crime or a Defense Against Crime, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 113, 130
(1991); John R. Lott, Jr., Now that the Brady Law Is Law, You Are Not Any Safer than Before, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Feb. 1, 1994, at A9. These findings are not surprising. Barring great fortuity, police
necessarily show up at a crime scene after a crime has begun, whereas a crime victim or a person
present when a crime begins can more accurately identify the attacker. See Jeffrey R. Snyder, A Nation
of Cowards, 113 PUB. INTEREST 40, 50 (1993).
239
That some of the mandatory-insurance proposals would exempt peace officers suggests that
the bills are attempts to inhibit individual firearm ownership rather than target the collateral harms
caused by guns. See supra text accompanying notes 48, 75, 87. After all, even peace officers make
mistakes. Indeed, based on the higher error rate among police officers, see supra note 238 and
accompanying text, by the reasoning of mandatory insurance proponents, police departments should
have to insure. Although state and local governments can act as insurers for mistaken shootings even if
they do not seek to escape liability, a benefit of insurance would be that insurers are good at
administering the claims, streamlining the settlement process, and avoiding the need for litigation that
can be especially painful for the victim and his or her family. See infra Part IV.B. But see supra note
124 (describing how the presence of insurance may make collecting on a potential liability more
difficult).
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an insurance mandate along these dimensions with respect to its ability to
reduce unlawful gun violence. It concluded with a word of caution that
mandatory insurance may inhibit desirable gun use. This Part discusses the
role of insurance in enabling socially beneficial activities, serving as a
source of societal gain. Insurance’s primary enabling features stem from
its efficiencies in risk bearing and claims administration.240
A. Risk Reduction
Most importantly, “[i]nsurance allows individuals to transfer risks to
insurance companies, thus reducing uncertainty about their net worth and
standard of living.”241 Insurers’ superior ability to diversify risk and access
capital gives them an advantage over insureds in bearing risk.242
For example, without insurance a great many homeowners could not
bear the risk of owning a home. For many, a large portion of their wealth
is in the form of home equity.243 A single catastrophe could wipe out a
family’s savings. Homeowners’ insurance allows an individual, in
exchange for a premium that amounts to a fraction of the value of his or
her home, to transfer the risk of catastrophic loss to the insurer. The
insurer is relatively unconcerned with an individual loss because the
premiums of its other insureds cover the cost of the catastrophe;244 it is able
immediately to pay the insured’s claim by relying on its capital reserves.
Insurance can similarly enable firearm owners to engage in lawful, but
not risk-free, activities, including the exercise of their constitutional and
statutory rights. These activities include defending oneself or others from
attack,245 engaging in hunting and other sporting activities,246 keeping a
firearm in the home,247 and participating in a citizen’s watch.248 The legal
240
It can also help educate insureds on how to minimize their risks. See supra Part III.B.3.
However, education may lead to something like a false confidence. Cf. Jon S. Vernick et al., Effects of
High School Driver Education on Motor Vehicle Crashes, Violations, and Licensure, 16 AM. J.
PREVENTIVE MED. 40, 44–45 (1999) (presenting the results of a study showing that education for high
school drivers is correlated with higher accident rates).
241
Doherty & Smith, supra note 138, at 5.
242
Id. Inexperience in the marketplace, however, may cause premiums to be higher than what is
actuarially fair. See supra text accompanying notes 210–211.
243
See Michael Neal, Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, Homeownership Remains a Key Component
of Household Wealth, HOUSINGECONOMICS.COM (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.nahb.org/generic.aspx?se
ctionID=734&genericContentID=215073&channelID=31.
244
If catastrophic risk becomes concentrated in a single area, insurers will offload some of it by
reinsuring. Neil A. Doherty, Innovations in Managing Catastrophe Risk, 64 J. RISK & INS. 713, 714
(1997).
245
The insurance programs discussed in Part II.C are primarily intended to serve this purpose.
246
See Dana Bash, Cheney Accidentally Shoots Fellow Hunter, CNN (Feb. 13, 2006),
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/02/12/cheney/.
247
See supra text accompanying notes 97, 227.
248
See George Zimmerman Wants State of Florida to Pay for Defense Expenses, NBC NEWS
(Aug. 27, 2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/27/20203855-george-zimmerman-wants-
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fees and expenses of defending lawsuits arising from these activities can be
crushing.249 Nonetheless, these activities can provide societal benefits such
as preventing serious crimes,250 creating jobs and generating tax revenue,251
and keeping dangerous and harmful wild animal populations in check.252
Sometimes an organization, like a shooting range or hunting club, will buy
the insurance, enabling its members and customers to engage in firearmrelated activities and practice their skills.253
Insurance can also make possible organizational activities, including
those run by governments, which generate societal benefits. For example,
the Boy Scouts teaches firearm safety and marksmanship254 and provides
insurance to protect itself and its volunteers from liability related to those
activities.255 In the public sphere, insurance is enabling schools to arm
their staff to protect against a repeat of the Newtown, Connecticut,
tragedy.256 Inversely, some school administrators are finding that their
state-of-florida-to-pay-for-defense-expenses?lite.
249
See id. (reporting that neighborhood-watch volunteer George Zimmerman, who was acquitted
in a shooting that took place in his watch area, spent nearly $300,000 defending himself, and is seeking
reimbursement of his legal expenses pursuant to a Florida law).
250
See supra Part III.C.3.
251
See NAT’L SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND., FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION INDUSTRY ECONOMIC
IMPACT REPORT 2012, at 1 (2012).
252
See, e.g., GA. DEP’T. OF NATURAL RES., AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEER POPULATION ON
JEKYLL ISLAND, GEORGIA AND THE MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS 12–13 (2011), available at
http://www.savejekyllisland.org/dnr_deer_management_plan.pdf (stating that deer overpopulation was
resulting in deer attacks on humans, vehicle collisions, landscaping damage, and other problems, and
promoting sharpshooting and hunting as the preferred and cost-effective ways to control the number of
deer); William F. Allan & Joann K. Wells, Characteristics of Vehicle-Animal Crashes in Which Vehicle
Occupants Are Killed, 6 TRAFFIC INJURY PREVENTION 56, 56–59 (2005) (reporting that vehicle-deer
collisions cause about 200 deaths and $1.1 billion in property damage per year); State Wildlife Bounty
Laws by State, BORN FREE USA, http://www.bornfreeusa.org/b4a2_bounty.php (last visited Mar. 5,
2014) (listing state bounties on harmful animals); see also Matthew Schuerman, Birth Control for
Deer?, AUDUBON (Feb. 8, 2002), http://archive.audubonmagazine.org/webstories/deer_birth_control.ht
ml (reporting that deer contraception costs about $1,000 for two years). This discussion would be
incomplete without a mention of wild pigs, which are notoriously destructive and have led some states
to adopt liberal hunting policies where they are concerned. See, e.g., Damage by Pigs, MISS. ST. UNIV.
(June 27, 2013), http://wildpiginfo.msstate.edu/damage-caused-by-pigs.html (estimating annual
agricultural and environmental damage at $1.5 billion); Rules for Shooting Feral Swine, MICH. DEP’T
NATURAL RES., http://www.michigan.gov/dnr/0,4570,7-153-10370_12145_55230-230093--,00.html
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (explaining that Michigan allows the year-round shooting of wild pigs).
253
See Baker & Farrish, supra note 9, at 304–05.
254
Shooting Sports, BOY SCOUTS AM., http://www.scouting.org/home/outdoorprogram/shootings
ports.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2014); Venturing Standards for Use of Firearms, BOY SCOUTS AM., htt
p://www.scouting.org/sitecore/content/Home/OutdoorProgram/Safety/shooting.aspx (last visited Apr.
15, 2014).
255
See Insurance Coverage, BOY SCOUTS AM., http://www.scouting.org/scoutsource/healthandsaf
ety/alerts/insurance.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
256
See, e.g., John Eligon, A Missouri School Trains Its Teachers to Carry Guns, and Most
Parents Approve, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2013, at A10. Many understandably find the idea of armed
schools distasteful. The point here is that insurance is enabling an activity that school administrators
deem beneficial.
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insurers would drop them if they armed their teachers, and therefore cannot
engage in what they believe to be a safety-enhancing endeavor.257 Perhaps
not surprisingly, given the negligible impact on expected liability that the
presence of firearms has on homeowners’, personal liability, life, and
commercial liability insurance,258 some determined administrators found
that “the search for another insurance provider was easier than expected,”
and even resulted in decreased premiums.259
B. Service Efficiencies
Once an insurer develops expertise in an area, routinizes its business,
and develops claims-handling efficiencies, it tends to pass the benefits of
its experience onto its insureds. Indeed, this is one of the main reasons for
purchasing insurance.260 Two key ways in which insureds benefit is from
their insurers’ skills in defending claims and managing the claims process.
1. Defending Insureds
In addition to paying for or reimbursing their insureds’ legal fees, it is
standard practice for, and often an obligation of, insurers to directly defend
their insureds against claims or to require the use of known subject-matterexpert lawyers.261 In the process, they develop a great deal of defense
experience from which their insureds benefit:
One specific area . . . in which insurers are almost certain to
have superior expertise is the defense of lawsuits. Access to
the insurer’s lawyers and other defense resources can reduce
the expected costs of third-party liability claims. Insurers
regularly defend [cases on the subject matter of the policies
that they write], whereas individual policyholders see them
257
See, e.g., Steven Yaccino, Schools Seeking to Arm Employees Hit Hurdle on Insurance, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2013, at A9. Of course, not everyone agrees that arming teachers would enhance safety.
See, e.g., John Eligon, A State Backs Guns in Class for Teachers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2013, at A1.
Both views have points in their favor. Compare id. (describing two instances in which firearms carried
in schools—one by a maintenance worker and another by a police officer—accidentally discharged),
with Allison Sherry, Independence Institute Scholar Praises Utah’s Laws to Prevent School Shootings,
DENVER POST: SPOT BLOG (Jan. 30, 2013, 3:35 PM), http://blogs.denverpost.com/thespot/2013/01/30/i
ndependence-institute-scholar-praises-utahs-laws-prevent-school-shootings/89781/ (noting that Utah
has allowed teachers to be armed for “several years” and that there has never been an attack at a Utah
school).
258
See supra text accompanying notes 146–150.
259
Yaccino, supra note 257.
260
Doherty & Smith, supra note 138, at 8, 10.
261
See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 9, at 1421, 1429; Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 136, at
214. If intentional acts are excluded from coverage, but a plaintiff framed a lawsuit in negligence
terms, conflict-of-interest rules would prohibit the insurer from controlling the defense. See Baker &
Swedloff, supra note 9, at 1433 & n.99; supra text accompanying notes 97–98, 215. In this case, the
insurer would have to provide independent counsel. Baker & Swedloff, supra note 9, at 1433 & n.99.
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A firearm owner with no experience defending a shooting-liability claim
would have, at a very stressful time in his or her life, trouble finding a
lawyer with the required subject-matter expertise. If he or she had the
money to pay for the defense, it could be ruinous; if not, he or she would
likely have a relatively difficult time borrowing the funds on favorable
terms when facing a lawsuit. Having insurance beforehand can solve these
problems.
2. Claim Management
In addition to specialization, insurers enjoy economies of scale in
managing the claims process.263 Insureds are, in effect, buying not only
liability coverage, but also claim-processing, loss-assessment, and claimsettlement services that insurers can provide at significantly lower cost.264
Insurers deploy their expertise to efficiently and accurately determine
fault, verify losses, assess both pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses, and
negotiate payouts according to industry standards.265 Once they determine
that a claim is valid, they monitor the remediation process. For property
damage, they can monitor repairs and maintain control over which
contractors do the repairs.266 Although managing the treatment process for
gunshot victims would be more hands-off, and more difficult because it
involves third-party coverage, insurers can audit treatment choices to
ensure that they were reasonable and necessary.
V. ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD
The previous Parts discussed the likely impact of firearm-owner
liability insurance on the positive and negative externalities associated with
gun ownership. They also discussed the potential for insurance to result in
each type of externality.
This Part continues in that vein by directly examining insureds’ likely
reactions to both the ability to acquire insurance and the presence of
insurance after it has been acquired. In economic terms, the former is
called adverse selection and the latter moral hazard. Adverse selection is
the “tendency for insurance to be purchased by people who are
disproportionately likely subsequently to experience an insured-against
event.”267 Moral hazard is the tendency for insurance to reduce an
262

Doherty & Smith, supra note 138, at 9.
Id. at 4, 6, 8.
264
Id. at 6, 8.
265
Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 136, at 213–14.
266
Id.
267
Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 271 n.164 (1996).
Although an insurance mandate may compel some firearm owners to buy insurance, the riskier owners
263
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insured’s incentive to prevent or minimize losses, and thus to engage in
riskier-than-normal behavior, because insurance will cover the losses.268
The following Section provides background by temporarily turning
from firearms to a different type of dangerous tool, and examining whether
that compulsory automobile insurance has led to more responsible driving.
The subsequent Section examines the likely effect of mandatory firearmliability insurance on gun owners’ behaviors.
A. The Automobile-Insurance Story
It is a widespread assumption—held by some sponsors of bills that
would have mandated firearm-owner liability insurance269 —that laws
requiring drivers to carry liability insurance have led to safer roads and
better driving habits. The evidence is not clear-cut, however.
Auto insurance is thought to have increased safety primarily through
experience rating and influencing public regulation.270 In the absence of
experience rating, compulsory insurance would be expected to increase
moral hazard among drivers because it would remove the threat of
financial loss that would otherwise hold recklessness in check.
Automobile liability insurance premiums usually increase after accidents,
however, so part of the inquiry becomes whether they increase enough.
Auto insurers are also heavily involved in lobbying for safety
regulations.271 Again, now that potential financial liability from accidents
is insured against, the primary question is whether the reduced expectation
of harm motivates drivers to drive more recklessly because they have less
fear of injury.
A review of studies, which can be grouped into those examining the
effects of mandatory insurance and those examining the effects of safety
regulation, is instructive. In the former category, some studies have found
that neither compulsory insurance (with its experience rating) nor financial
incentives for safer driver behavior have had a predictable or sustained
impact on safety.272 Others have found, as the theory of moral hazard
still have incentive to buy more coverage. Also, one might buy the insurance for the gun that he or she
intends to use, but not for those that he or she keeps hidden away.
268
Id. at 239.
269
See supra text accompanying notes 34, 41, 71.
270
See, e.g., Baker & Swedloff, supra note 9, at 1427–28; Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 136,
at 221–23.
271
See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 136, at 222–23 (discussing the well-known
example of auto insurers lobbying for air bags).
272
See Sajjad A. Hashmi, The Effect of Compulsory Automobile Liability Insurance on Highway
Safety, 7 BUS. SOC’Y. 13, 15, 17 (1967) (showing no correlation between compulsory liability
insurance and highway safety); Leon S. Robertson, Insurance Incentives and Seat Belt Use, 74 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1157, 1157–58 (1984) (asserting that financial incentives, via insurance or otherwise, for
seat belt use have, at best, a short term effect).
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would predict, a correlation between compulsory insurance and an increase
in accident injuries and loss costs.273 With firearm-liability premiums
likely to be lower than those for automobile liability,274 the negative
incentive effects may be worse in the firearm setting.
The findings are more optimistic when it comes to the effects of safety
regulations, though in some ways more worrisome. Although some studies
conclude that safety regulations have led to more accidents and no
decrease in overall injuries,275 there is general accord that safety devices
have decreased injuries.276
Troublingly, and again in accord with moral hazard theory, improved
vehicle safety for occupants (whose behavior, recall, is also unrestrained
by fear of financial loss) causes drivers to be more reckless, and the saving
of auto occupants’ lives results in more pedestrian and other non-occupant
deaths.277 This type of trade-off would be especially problematic in the
gun-use context. Further, insurers’ financial incentives, and therefore their
lobbying incentives, do not always correlate with greater safety. Indeed,
their lobbying efforts have been shown to result in increased loss costs.278
In sum, the impact of insurance on auto safety is at best unclear. At
worst, it has made driving less safe for both drivers and bystanders. As
even one insurance-industry representative has discussed, “As a public
policy matter, liability insurance is ineffective and ultimately proves to be
unpopular. . . . [T]he reality indicates that the hoped-for results don’t really
occur.”279 It often “only enrich[es] middlemen while fail[ing] to address

273

See, e.g., Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident
Liability Laws on Traffic Safety, 47 J.L. & ECON. 357, 373–78 (2004) (discussing increased traffic
fatalities); Tony Attrino, Compulsory Auto Laws Blasted, NAT’L UNDERWRITER, Sept. 7, 1998, at 2, 65
(discussing rising loss costs). It is difficult to find studies conclusively stating that compulsory
insurance has led to increased road safety via experience rating. See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 9,
at 1428. Some commentators nevertheless seem, at least tentatively, to believe that it has. See, e.g.,
Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 136, at 220–21; Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety
Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 677, 684 (1975).
274
See supra text accompanying notes 144–150.
275
See, e.g., Peltzman, supra note 273, at 677, 721.
276
See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER & ROBERT E. LITAN, THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF
LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 206 (1991); NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, INJURY FACTS
102–03 (2011); Robert W. Crandall & John D. Graham, Automobile Safety Regulation and Offsetting
Behavior: Some New Empirical Estimates, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 328, 330 (1984); Kneuper & Yandle,
supra note 204, at 109 & n.2.
277
See HENRY N. BUTLER ET AL., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 380 (3d ed. 2014);
Crandall & Graham, supra note 276, at 328, 330; Peltzman, supra note 273, at 677, 717.
278
See supra text accompanying note 204.
279
Harman, supra note 7 (citing David Snyder, Vice President of International Policy at the
Property Casualty Insurers Association of America). These studies do not speak of automobile liability
insurance’s success at compensating injured parties who otherwise could not collect. Some may decide
that more injuries, even to innocent pedestrians, are acceptable if it means that more people are
compensated overall. Such a decision should not be made lightly.
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[its] social aim.”
With lessons from the automotive sector in mind, the following
Section considers how adverse selection and moral hazard might manifest
itself in the context of gun ownership.
B. The Likely Firearm Insurance Story
The greatest fear surrounding mandatory liability coverage for firearm
owners is that it could lead to more gun violence. An increase in the
reckless treatment of guns, driven by a decreased fear of financial
consequences,281 is more disconcerting than analogous events in the
automobile context because a shooting is far more likely to result in death
than an automotive injury.282 The problem is likely to be exacerbated if
premiums are low.283
This Section considers whether and how gun owners’ expected
behaviors might change as a result of insurance availability. It discusses
the insuring of: (1) losses caused by intentional (including malicious and
defensive) shootings by gun owners; (2) losses caused by shootings
resulting from the owner’s negligence; and (3) firearms themselves against
theft.
1. Intentional Shootings by Firearm Owners
Intentional shootings by gun owners include criminal and defensive
shootings. The incentive issues associated with each are considered in turn.
a. Intentional Criminal Shootings
Liability insurance currently does not cover intentional criminal
harms.284 This is “the kind of behavior that is so unacceptable that
[insurers are] not going to offer liability insurance for it.”285 In a few
280

Id.
See Bunn, supra note 4 (quoting the American Insurance Association as saying “‘[i]t could
have the opposite of its intended effect’ . . . . The laws may lead to reckless actions by gun owners who
‘will not have their own assets, property or income at stake’ . . . . It would be a sad irony if the outcome
of such a mandate was more gun violence”).
282
See supra note 143 (showing, in the compiled table, that shooting injuries are about 3, 49, and
16 times more likely to result in death for accidents, assaults, and self-harm incidents, respectively,
than corresponding automobile injuries).
283
See, e.g., Gilles & Lund supra note 8, at 21; supra text accompanying notes 144–145.
284
See Stephanie K. Jones, Interest in Personal Gun Liability Insurance Protection Increasing,
INS. J. (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2013/04/11/288010.htm
(“Insurers don’t cover illegal acts, ever, period.” (quoting Dr. Robert Hartwig, President of the
Insurance Information Institute)). But cf. id. (citing some rare exceptions and partly analogous
situations).
285
Jay MacDonald, Gun Owners Seek Out Self-Defense Insurance, BANKRATE.COM (Feb.
1, 2013), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/insurance/gun-owners-seek-self-defense-insurance.aspx
(quoting Tom Baker, William Maul Measey Professor of Law and Health Sciences, University of
281
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instances, covering illegal acts could encourage malicious shootings by
transferring the risk of tort liability and the costs of defense to insurers.286
It is difficult, however, to imagine that an individual who is intent on
shooting another would be deterred by tort liability or the prospect of
increased premiums if he or she is not deterred by criminal sanctions for
homicide.
One approach for avoiding adverse selection and moral hazard in
intentional shootings might be for the insurer to subrogate against the
insured for claims arising out of criminal shootings.287 Yet, even this
solution is only likely to work in the rare cases where such a shooting is
committed by an individual with assets and on whom a court is willing to
impose liability.288 And the only real benefits in those cases would be that
the victim could efficiently settle with the insurer rather than litigate with
the shooter, and that the insurer would have an advantage over the victim
in collecting from the shooter.289 These benefits could be offset, however,
by the insurer’s superior skill in fighting the claim.290
Covering intentional criminal shootings is thus a bad idea because
insurance should not be expected to deter such shootings, and may
encourage them.291 If it is mandated, so should subrogation, which would
(mostly in theory, given that so many shooters are judgment-proof)
allocate some of the financial costs of the shooting back onto the shooter.
b. Defensive Shootings
Although defensive shootings are intentional, they are fortuitous
inasmuch as a victim does not plan to be attacked. Their social palatability
generally ranges from worried acceptance to affirmative encouragement.
Where one’s views fall on this spectrum presumably depends on how
much faith one has in an individual’s ability to defend him- or herself and
others without causing collateral injuries. As the evidence presented above
Pennsylvania Law School). Suicides fall into the same category. In a gun-owner suicide, a liability
policy would essentially serve as a life insurance policy.
286
See supra text accompanying note 241. In any case, recall that it is unlikely that tort liability
will be a meaningful factor in deterring or compensating for intentional shootings. See supra Part III.
287
Baker & Farrish, supra note 9, at 313 n.63.
288
See supra text accompanying notes 123–124.
289
Tom Baker, Liability Insurance at the Tort-Crime Boundary, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS
CULTURAL PRACTICE 66, 74 (David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009); see supra Part IV.B.2.
290
See supra Part IV.B.1. An insurer would presumably have a duty to defend its insured at least
until the insured was found guilty. A no-contest or other plea resulting in a penalty would also suffice.
291
See supra text accompanying notes 272–273. Nonetheless, some proposals would have
explicitly or impliedly covered such shootings. See supra text accompanying notes 28, 48, 54, 79.
Pennsylvania’s proposal was the only one that would have explicitly excluded unlawful acts from
coverage. See supra text accompanying note 91. One pair of commentators believes that mandating
coverage of criminal shootings would probably be unconstitutional. See Gilles & Lund, supra note 8,
at 19.
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shows, citizens are both effective and precise in their defensive gun uses.292
Although a number of homeowners’ and general liability policies may
cover (i.e., make exceptions to their intentional-act exclusions) losses
resulting from the reasonable use of force to protect persons and/or
property,293 the DGUs measured in the surveys conducted to date did not
occur under a mandatory firearm insurance regime. Indeed, many of the
gun owners likely did not know that their self-defense acts could
potentially be covered by homeowners’ or other liability insurance.
The imposition of a separate compulsory liability system would alert
gun owners to the presence of insurance. If this knowledge leads to less
care in making the choice to use a weapon in a self-defense situation, then
the insurance would be socially undesirable. If it leads to a reduction in
over-cautiousness,294 however, which in turn leads to more instances of
legitimate and effective defense, insurance would be desirable.295
2. Shootings Resulting from Firearm Owners’ Negligence296
The typical goal of liability insurance is to cover insureds’
negligence.297 Cases where a firearm is under the owner’s direct or
indirect control—where it has not been stolen or entrusted to another—are
the most analogous to the automobile context. In these situations, one can
reasonably expect insureds’ behavior to parallel that of insured drivers—
they are likely to become less careful.298
Negligent entrustment and negligent storage situations are more
nuanced. Many of these situations involve a minor injuring someone. In
292

See supra Part III.C.3.
See MONGE, supra note 100, at 39–45; Kochenburger, supra note 5, Part II.C.2.
294
Such over-cautiousness is not without merit. See Patrik Jonsson, George Zimmerman Arrest:
Proof that the System Worked—or Failed?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 12, 2012),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0412/George-Zimmerman-arrest-Proof-that-the-system-workedor-failed (quoting Professor Nicholas J. Johnson as saying that “[t]he thing that’s clear now to
everybody is that no matter where you are, whether you’re in Florida or some other American
jurisdiction, if you shoot someone and claim self-defense, and the circumstances are questionable, you
have unleashed a nightmare for yourself”).
295
Cf. State v. Villanueva, 311 P.3d 79, 82–83 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that respondent
properly was awarded reimbursement legal defense costs and lost wages following acquittal based on
finding of use of firearm in self-defense). Such a situation, where increased consumption driven by the
presence of insurance creates a positive outcome, is called “efficient moral hazard.” See generally John
A. Nyman, Consumer-Driven Health Care: Moral Hazard, The Efficiency of Income Transfers, and
Market Power, 13 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2006).
296
Though the term “liability insurance” implies that the insured must be liable for insurance
coverage to apply, some proponents may also envision the coverage to cover acts where the gun owner
took proper care. The moral-hazard concerns described in this Section should apply to those gun
owners as well.
297
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
298
See supra Part V.A. One pair of commentators believes that mandating coverage of such
accidental shootings would be constitutionally problematic unless it was done via homeowners’ and
renters’ policies. See Gilles & Lund, supra note 8, at 19–20.
293
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these cases, the owner is often already subject to criminal liability, the fear
of which should mostly or entirely negate any inclination to take less care
because of the presence of insurance coverage.299 In situations that do not
involve minors, however, the moral hazard problem would be at its apex
because there would be little doubt of coverage where insureds do not
commit any intentional acts. In cases where tort liability would stick,
insurance would take a non-judgment-proof party’s skin out of the game.
A judgment-proof party would not have skin in the game in the first place,
but here the incentive to take care is presumably already low, perhaps only
to be made even lower if he or she actually obtains insurance.300
3. Insuring Firearms Against Theft
At least one commentator has suggested that firearm owners should be
required to carry theft insurance on their weapons, believing that this
“would provide an effective incentive for proper firearm storage.”301 It is
difficult to fathom how reducing the cost of having a firearm stolen would
increase the likelihood that it is stored so as to prevent theft. One would
expect the opposite result in this textbook example of moral hazard.302
***
This Part considered the likely behavior of gun owners who
maintained mandatory firearm-liability insurance. The next Part goes
further, asking what the uptake of insurance would be in the first instance.
VI. DEFIANCE
Using the backdrop of current law and proposals put forth to date, this
Article has thus far discussed the expected interplay between a compulsory
firearm-owner liability insurance regime, the environment in which it
operates, and the insurers and insureds whom it would affect. This Part
tests the premise that firearm owners would comply with an insurance
mandate to a degree where one might deem it a success.
For a mandatory insurance system to function, the targets of the system
299

See McClurg, supra note 217, at 1202.
See supra Part III.A.
301
Pohlman, supra note 5.
302
The carrying by a single insured of theft insurance on his or her firearms, in addition to
firearm-liability insurance, might also lead to a risk for the insurer that is greater than the sum of its
parts: liability insurance would increase the incentive to store improperly inasmuch as it would shield
the owner against tort liability, but the owner would still be out the cost of the firearm. Theft insurance
would take care of the firearm’s cost, further increasing the incentive to store the firearm in the open
where it can be found and used to injure someone. A multi-policy penalty, where an insured who
carries both theft and liability insurance would pay a premium that is greater than the sum of what the
premiums would be if he or she maintained only one or the other type of coverage, may make sense
under these circumstances.
300
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actually have to insure. Satisfying this basic premise has proven difficult
in the automobile context,303 and promises to be far more problematic in
the firearm context.
Although there is little doubt that criminals will not insure, it is first
worth discussing whether otherwise ordinary and law-abiding Americans
would resist a large-scale insurance mandate.
A. Insurance As De Facto Registration
An effect of mandatory insurance would be to provide insurance
companies with a substantial amount of information about insureds. Even
if insurers were uninterested in the number and types of firearms owned by
each insured,304 it appears that many of the proposals put forth by
legislators to date intended to mandate firearm-specific coverage.305 The
amount of data stored by insurers is vast, and it is standard practice for
them to share the data for purposes of developing pricing models and
ensuring that insureds are truthful on their coverage applications.306
A question asked by many gun owners will be whether, and to what
extent, the firearm-specific information will be protected. Constitutionally
mandated protection would satisfy the greatest number of firearm owners,
but even that would not satisfy many: courts can reinterpret it307 and it may

303
The Insurance Research Council estimates that 13.8% and 14.3% of motorists were uninsured
in 2009 and 2008, respectively, and that rates vary between states from 4.5% to 28%. Press Release,
Ins. Research Council, Recession Marked by Bump in Uninsured Motorists: IRC Analysis Finds One
in Seven Drivers Are Uninsured (Apr. 21, 2011), available at http://www.insuranceresearch.org/sites/default/files/downloads/IRCUM2011_042111.pdf; see also Attrino, supra note 282,
at 2 (“With an estimated 15 percent of the national population driving without liability insurance, a
report from the National Association of Independent Insurers questions the effectiveness of compulsory
auto insurance laws.”).
304
See supra text accompanying notes 146–149.
305
See supra text accompanying and surrounding notes 44, 49, 55, 62, 72, 82–83, 93. Oregon’s
statute would have further required owners to report firearm transfers to the police. See supra text
accompanying note 83.
306
Cf. SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
136–42 (2000) (describing the Medical Information Bureau’s sharing of insureds’ medical
information); Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 136, at 206 n.18 (stating that insurers send “two billion
detailed records” on insureds’ premium and loss history to a central rating bureau that turns it into
information used for pricing and loss-mitigation purposes); C.L.U.E. Report, LEXISNEXIS,
https://personalreports.lexisnexis.com/fact_act_claims_bundle/landing.jsp (last visited Feb. 19, 2014)
(describing the Comprehensive Loss Underwriting Exchange reports available from LexisNexis); The
Facts About MIB, MIB.COM, http://www.mib.com/facts_about_mib.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2014)
(describing itself as an insurer-supported “information exchange . . . . [that deals in] coded reports
represent[ing] different medical conditions and other conditions (typically hazardous hobbies and
adverse driving records) affecting the insurability of the applicant”). The MIB’s website is worth
perusing for the insight it provides, albeit in euphemistic terms, into the extent to which insurers share
information.
307
As Professor Nicholas J. Johnson wrote,
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not be strong enough to prevent improper law-enforcement access.
Many firearm owners fear registration because they believe that it is a
prerequisite to firearm confiscation. Many are likely to view an insurance
mandate—which will at least identify as a firearm owner anyone who
insures, and may identify the specific firearms owned—as a backdoor
method of registration. Such a concern is understandable given the
admissions to this effect by proponents of both compulsory insurance and
gun control,309 and that “[t]he progression from registration to confiscation
has occurred both domestically and internationally.”310
Before the ink was dry on the Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision in Heller, holding that
the Second Amendment guarantees an individual the right to bear arms, speculation
began about how robust and enduring that right would turn out to be. With only one
vote between the opinion by Justice Scalia and something entirely different, the
stage is set for confirmation controversies involving a nominee’s commitment to
stare decisis, strict construction, originalism, and other coded inquiries intended to
determine whether the nominee would vote to uphold, undermine, or reverse the
result in Heller. This is entirely understandable. It seems inevitable in modern
America that today’s losers on big constitutional questions will view a changed
lineup on the Court as more promising than the long work and long shot of a
constitutional amendment.
Nicholas J. Johnson, Imagining Gun Control in America: Understanding the Remainder Problem, 43
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 837, 839 n.9 (2008).
308
See James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National Security, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1468–69 (2004) (describing government use of private data). And then there are
the massive domestic-spying efforts of the National Security Agency (NSA), to which no law seems to
apply. See, e.g., Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Top-Secret Court Castigated N.S.A. on Surveillance,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2013, at A1 (stating that a secret court had declared the NSA’s domestic spying
unconstitutional in 2011, but that the spying continues). Personal privacy is another reason for
individuals to keep their personal information out of insurers’ hands. But leaks happen, and they are all
but impossible to contain. Not only may containment be unlawful, see, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (holding that the federal government could not enjoin
major newspapers from publishing classified documents), but the speed with which information can
spread on the Internet may make it impossible; see Michael Roppolo, FOIAed Again: “Gun Map”
Newspaper Seeks More Info on Firearms Owners, FOXNEWS.COM (July 3, 2013),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/07/03/foiaed-again-gun-map-newspaper-seeks-more-info-onfirearms-owners/ (describing the posting to the Internet of personal information about holders of New
York handgun permits).
309
See Emily Miller, New Jersey Bill Is Outright Gun Ban on .22-Caliber Rifles and Leads to
Confiscation, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/28/newjersey-bill-is-outright-gun-ban-on-22-caliber-/?page=all#pagebreak (describing an incident in the New
Jersey legislature where a speaker was caught on a hot microphone saying, “We needed a bill that was
going to confiscate, confiscate, confiscate”); supra note 180 and accompanying text; see infra text
accompanying note 326.
310
Johnson, supra note 307, at 868; see James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Comprehensive
Handgun Licensing & Registration: An Analysis & Critique of Brady II, Gun Control’s Next (and
Last?) Step, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 81, 105–06 (1998). Confiscations have happened
domestically in the last few decades in New Orleans, Washington, D.C., New York City, California,
and New Jersey. See Revell v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding
that state authorities’ confiscation of an out-of-state gun-owner’s firearm did not violate his Due
Process rights); Stephen P. Halbrook, “Only Law Enforcement Will Be Allowed to Have Guns”:
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Rightly or wrongly, Americans have more ingrained reasons to defy
insurance mandates that they believe may lead to confiscation. These
include an exceptional cultural attachment to firearms, a belief that they
have a right to own a gun coupled with a penchant for defensiveness of
their rights, and a belief that firearms are important for their security in a
context where government is unable or unwilling to protect them.311
In other words, there are reasons to believe that many otherwise-lawabiding firearm owners would respond to an insurance mandate the same
way that they have responded to mandatory gun registration: by defying it.
Worldwide defiance ratios of mandatory gun-registration programs
average 2.6 withheld guns for each registered one.312 U.S. defiance rates,
however, are estimated to be much higher in the limited examples available
from jurisdictions not known for their pro-gun attitudes: in connection with
state or city “assault weapon” bans, New Jersey saw 98% to greater-than99% defiance, Boston and Cleveland saw 99% defiance, and California
saw 90% defiance or more.313 An estimated 90% of secondary-market
handgun transfers in Massachusetts are unrecorded despite mandatory
registration.314 If the New York Police Department’s estimates about the
Hurricane Katrina and the New Orleans Firearm Confiscations, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 339, 339
(2008) (describing how police officers confiscated lawfully-possessed guns in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina); Johnson, supra note 307, at 868–69 & nn.143–45 (noting numerous examples of registration
leading to confiscation). It was also attempted in Massachusetts. See David B. Kopel, The Great Gun
Control War of the Twentieth Century—and Its Lessons for Gun Laws Today, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1527, 1558–65 (2012) (discussing a failed legislative attempt to confiscate all handguns); see also
Cheryl K. Chumley, NYC Alarms with Notice: “Immediately Surrender Your Rifle,” WASH. TIMES
(Nov. 28, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/28/nyc-alarms-notice-immediatelysurrender-your-rifle/ (discussing the efforts of New York City law enforcement authorities in
confiscating firearms in the city that violated newly enacted magazine-capacity laws). Internationally,
confiscation happened in, among other countries, England, Canada, and Australia—the nations that are
arguably most like ours. Johnson, supra note 307, at 869 & nn.146–48.
Earlier cases of domestic and international firearm confiscation have been outright malign. See,
e.g., JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 289–93 (describing the confiscation of arms from, and
subsequent terrorizing of, freed slaves); Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second
Amendment: Declarations by a Co-Equal Branch on the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 62
TENN. L. REV. 597, 600 (1995) (describing Communist and Nazi firearm registrations and
confiscations); Doug Giles, Bitter, Clingy Gun Owners of America, TOWNHALL.COM (Apr. 26, 2008),
http://townhall.com/columnists/douggiles/2008/04/26/bitter%2c_clingy_gun_owners_of_america/page/
full (describing situations where firearm confiscations were followed by genocides).
311
See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 307, at 848–51, 855–56, 860–63 & nn.47, 52–53, 56, 58, 60,
113, 116 (discussing the psychological tendencies of many gun-owners to defy registration mandates,
largely arising from a fear of confiscation).
312
Aaron Karp, Completing the Count: Civilian Firearms, in SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2007: GUNS
AND THE CITY 39, 55 (Eric G. Berman et al. eds., 2007).
313
Jacobs & Potter, supra note 310, at 106; see Seth Mydans, California Gun Control Law Runs
into Rebellion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1990, at A1 (stating that an estimated 97.6% of firearms defined
as assault weapons had not been registered in California with a week remaining before the expiration of
the one-year registration period).
314
Jacobs & Potter, supra note 310, at 106–07.
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total number of unregistered firearms in the city are to be believed, then
New York City, where all firearms must be registered, has a defiance rate
in the range of 95%.315 In New York State, an official statement from the
Governor’s Office said of a new registration requirement that “[m]any of
these assault-rifle owners aren’t going to register; we realize that,” and
acknowledged that the Office knew of a planned boycott and expected
“widespread violations” of the new law.316 In addition, a looming
insurance mandate is likely to drive would-be defiers to stock up on guns
before the mandate goes into effect.317 Indeed, it may be that people are
buying guns now given that insurance mandates are being discussed.
While an insurance requirement is admittedly one step removed from
pure registration, many are likely to view it as a small step. It is reasonable
to assume that individuals willing to risk jail time to keep a firearm
unregistered will be willing to risk a lower penalty to keep an otherwiselegal firearm uninsured. Whatever the ultimate defiance rate would be,
with roughly three hundred million privately-owned firearms in the
country,318 the number of unregistered weapons is likely to be enormous.319
Noncompliance is also likely to affect the behavior of withholders. In
alignment with the safety goals of mandatory insurance, those who defy
insurance requirements can be expected to guard their firearms more
closely from theft to avoid being found guilty of status crimes.320 On the

315
This estimate suffers from two imprecisions. First, it is calculated by comparing the roughly
93,164 registered firearms in the City in 2011, Jo Craven McGinty, The Rich, the Famous, the Armed,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2011, at MB6, to the estimated two million illegal firearms in the City in 1993,
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROMISING
STRATEGIES TO REDUCE GUN VIOLENCE 100 (1999). Second, the estimate of two million illegal
firearms in the City should be viewed with some skepticism given that the City’s total population in
1993 was somewhere between 7.3 and 8 million. New York City Dep’t of City Planning, Population
2000 Census Summary, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/pop2000.shtml (last
visited Feb. 19, 2014). If the figure is in fact correct, it suggests that many New Yorkers who claim to
favor more gun control and would likely support an insurance mandate would nonetheless defy it.
“[A]n inventory this large suggests that many New Yorkers have had guns, have been acquiring guns,
and have been deciding to keep guns illegally for a long time.” Johnson, supra note 307, at 852.
316
Fredric U. Dicker, Hit Us with Your Best Shot, Andy!, N.Y. POST (Jan. 21, 2013),
http://nypost.com/2013/01/21/hit-us-with-your-best-shot-andy/.
317
See Clark A. Wohlferd, Recent Development, Much Ado About Not Very Much: The
Expiration of the Assault Weapons Ban as an Act of Legislative Responsibility, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 471, 479–80 & n.64 (2005) (noting that, prior to a ban of so-called “assault weapons,”
individuals and dealers “stocked up on weapons in order to circumvent the impending ban”).
318
JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 231, ch.12, at 7.
319
Using the international defiance rate, which is likely very low for the United States, suggests
more than 216 million uninsured weapons. While some of the unregistered weapons could conceivably
be found, a great many are “no-paper” firearms—those which have no paper trail leading to the current
owner—in the country that are effectively impossible to locate absent some action by their owners.
Johnson, supra note 307, at 869–71.
320
See Johnson, supra note 307, at 861–62.
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other hand, if the withheld firearms are stolen, their now-criminal321
owners will have no incentive to report the theft to law enforcement.322
Turning a great many firearm owners into criminals can lead to other
unwanted consequences, discussed in the next Section.
B. Impact on Criminal Behavior
Proponents and skeptics of gun-liability insurance mandates agree that
perpetrators of firearm violence will neither insure nor be deterred from
firearm use because of an insurance requirement.323 The usefulness of
insurance thus depends on the time it takes for an insured owner to report a
firearm lost or stolen.324 While encouraging owners to report firearms that
have left their control may indeed be beneficial, a direct statutory
command is more likely to achieve that end,325 especially given the
presumed unwillingness of individuals to report the theft of an illicitly
uninsured firearm, and without the problems with involving the insurance
machinery.
Mandatory insurance is also advocated as a mechanism to prevent
straw purchases—situations where one who may otherwise lawfully
purchase a firearm buys one for someone who may not. The theory is that:
(1) the prospect of having to commit insurance fraud (by not checking
whether the buyer has insurance or by reporting a stolen or lost firearm that
has actually been given to another) would deter straw purchasers; and
(2) insurance would serve as a form of registration that would either
require a purchaser to keep paying premiums on straw-sold guns or report

321
See supra text accompanying notes 46, 52, 57, 69. Beyond criminal liability, owners would
face civil penalties of up to $10,000. See supra text accompanying notes 29, 86.
322
Johnson, supra note 307, at 864, 871. One potential solution to this problem of unreported
thefts is to provide a safe harbor for the reporting of such thefts.
323
See Gilles & Lund, supra note 8, at 19 & n.11; Pawar, supra note 5; Taranto, supra note 7;
Wasik, supra note 2. But see Pohlman, supra note 5 (stating that a criminal record would be one factor
to go into a premium calculation). It is unclear how this calculation would work for the types of
criminals that are of concern here given that felons (and domestic-violence misdemeanants) are already
prohibited from possessing firearms and that insurers cannot be expected to insure the firearm
possession of those who may not possess firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012). There may also be selfincrimination problems with mandating insurance for criminals. See supra note 125.
324
Four states’ proposals explicitly tied the coverage window to the reporting of a firearm’s theft
or loss. See supra text accompanying notes 50, 56, 74, 85. For the other states, tort law’s proximatecause doctrines would presumably govern.
325
Cf. Cassandra R. Cole et al., The Uninsured Motorist Problem: An Investigation of the Impact
of Enforcement and Penalty Severity on Compliance, 19 J. INS. REG. 613, 614 (2001) (arguing that
requiring insurance is more effective than providing financial incentives to maintain insurance). A bill
that would have required gun owners to report a theft or loss within seven days was recently vetoed in
California. Josh Richman, A List of California Gun Bills Signed or Vetoed by Gov. Jerry Brown,
INSIDEBAYAREA.COM (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.insidebayarea.com/news/ci_24291225/listcalifornia-gun-bills-signed-or-vetoed-by.
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326

an excessive number of guns lost or stolen.
It is unlikely, however, that
someone who is undeterred by the potential of a ten-year prison sentence
for making a straw purchase327 would be daunted by the addition of
insurance fraud liability, and using insurance as a gun-registration tactic
would exacerbate the fears of confiscation and increase the incentive for
defiance that are inevitably created by any registration regime.328 In any
case, given that straw sales account for a small portion of crime guns,329
the drawbacks of an insurance mandate are likely to outweigh any benefit
from the marginal cases where insurance may dissuade straw sales.
An insurance mandate also has the potential to create a black market
where people pay more for never-insured, no-paper firearms that have
never been recorded in an insurer’s systems.330 Not only do Americans
own several-hundred million firearms with which to fuel this market, but
“our borders are permeable, . . . guns and ammunition are relatively easy to
manufacture,”331 and the illicit international arms trade is robust.332
Two potential benefits of a shift from a legal market from the
perspective of those who favor more difficult access to firearms are that an
insurance requirement would make firearms more expensive for those who
would use them for crime and create incentives for gun owners to retain
them.333 Though these effects assume both that the demand for firearms is
elastic and that the illicit international trade (and existing domestic gun
stock) would not adequately meet the post-insurance-mandate demand,
they are likely relatively safe bets.334 More dangerous are the possibilities
that “some contraband imported guns will be more lethal than the ones
326

See John Wasik, Gun Liability Insurance: Still a Viable Proposal, FORBES (Dec. 29, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2012/12/29/gun-liability-insurance-still-a-viable-proposal/;
Pawar, supra note 5.
327
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2), (6); see United States v. Moore, 109 F.3d 1456, 1460–61 (9th Cir.
1997) (en banc) (describing the “straw man doctrine”).
328
See supra Part VI.A.
329
See Gary Kleck & Shun-Yung Kevin Wang, The Myth of Big-Time Gun Trafficking and the
Overinterpretation of Gun Tracing Data, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1277 (2009) (stating, in perhaps the
most detailed analysis of the source of crime guns to date, that straw purchases likely account for only
about one percent of crime guns); Julius Wachtel, Sources of Crime Guns in Los Angeles, California,
21 POLICING 220, 230–32 (1998) (stating that seven percent of the crime guns traced in a Los Angeles
study originated from straw purchases); Philip J. Cook et al., Underground Gun Markets 11 & n.21
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11737, 2005) (stating that “straw purchasing is
rare in Chicago’s underground gun market”).
330
See Johnson, supra note 307, at 844, 856–59, 862, 877; supra Part VI.A.
331
Johnson, supra note 307, at 843 & n.24.
332
See Maria Huag, Conflict and Corruption: Global Illicit Small Arms Transfers, in SMALL
ARMS SURVEY 2001: PROFILING THE PROBLEM 165, 167 (Peter Batchelor & Keith Krause eds., 2001)
(estimating the value at $1 billion annually).
333
See Johnson, supra note 307, at 844, 877.
334
But see Daniel D. Polsby, The False Premise of Gun Control, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 1994),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/03/the-false-promise-of-gun-control/306744/
(arguing that demand for crime guns is inelastic).
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they replaced,” as happened after gun bans went into effect in England and
Ireland;335 that the demand for never-insured guns would lead to the
increased influence of organized crime, including gangs, dealing in such
firearms;336 or that individuals will simply make guns to supply the black
market.337 Although the net effect of these possibilities is difficult to
measure, they have been observed in other contexts.
VII. CONCLUSION
Compulsory firearm-owner liability insurance should not be expected
reliably to serve as either a source of compensation for shooting victims or
a private regulator of firearm violence. It may exacerbate the problems it
seeks to alleviate by incentivizing firearm owners to take less care with
their weapons and insurers to lobby for regulations that result in more
injuries and cap liability. It is also demonstrably improbable that enough
otherwise-law-abiding firearm owners would comply with a mandate for it
to be effective.
Insurance can, however, enable socially desirable, but not risk-free,
firearm-related activities by those who would otherwise be unable to bear
the risks inherent in those activities. It can also ensure that firearm-related
liability claims are administered efficiently and without fraud. Such
insurance would tend to be purchased by those engaging in the beneficial
activities.
One of the best ways to incentivize an activity is to compensate it or to
remove its financial consequences. Well-meaning legislators, regulators,
and industry members would therefore best serve their constituencies by
encouraging optional insurance that covers potential liability arising from
socially useful activities, rather than pushing for unhelpful mandates that
may aggravate the firearm violence that they seek to remedy.
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Johnson, supra note 307, at 844–45 (citing Karp, supra note 312, at 44).
Id. at 877–78.
337
See id. at 845–47 (describing the ease with which a firearm can be manufactured using
relatively simple tools).
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